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Abstract 
There are more than one billion persons with disabilities worldwide, constituting one of the most 
marginalized groups in the world. This paper investigates barriers to entrepreneurship among 
persons with disabilities. The focus is on psychological barriers like prejudice and lack of self-
confidence, which are influenced by social identities. The analysis is based on a lab experiment 
carried out in Kampala, Uganda, in which the participants were youths in the final years of 
education, and thus on the doorstep to the market for employment. Given the lack of jobs, 
starting a business is often the most likely prospect. The social identity of persons with 
disabilities is studied through the use of priming, i.e. making a particular social identity salient. 
The main finding is that priming increases the confidence of persons with disabilities. Thus, 
there is an empowerment effect of making the social identity of persons with disabilities salient, 
contrary to the expectations. This is probably due to a selection effect as the participants have a 
relatively high level of education; the participants with disabilities are probably more empowered 
than the typical young person with disabilities in Uganda. Nevertheless, people generally believe 
that persons with disabilities perform worse than people without disabilities, although they 
actually perform equally well. The results suggest that prejudice is a key barrier to 
entrepreneurship among persons with disabilities.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“The poverty, disadvantage and social exclusion experienced by many disabled people are not 
the inevitable result of their impairments or medical conditions but, rather, stem from attitudinal 
and environmental barriers. This is known as ‘the social model of disability’ and provides a basis 
for the successful implementation of the duty to promote disability equality.” 
UK Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 2005 Code of Practice 
 
United Nations (UN) estimates that more than 1 billion people worldwide have some kind of 
disability.
1
 One in four households contains a Person With Disabilities (PWD). PWDs generally 
have poorer health, lower education achievements, fewer economic opportunities and higher rates 
of poverty than people without disabilities (WB and WHO, 2011). In 2006, 100 million people 
worldwide acquired a disability because they lacked the resources necessary to prevent 
malnutrition, underlining that the link between poverty and disability is strong and bidirectional 
(UKG, 2000). 
According to WHO’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health (ICF), 
disability refers to impairments, activity limitations, and participation restrictions (WB and WHO, 
2011). Thus, disability arises from the interaction between health conditions and contextual 
factors, i.e. environmental and personal factors. For instance, environmental factors include 
support and relationships, services and policies, and attitudes. Personal factors could be self-
confidence and motivation, i.e. factors likely to influence the extent to which an individual 
participates in society. PWDs do not form a homogenous group; they could be physically, sensory 
or mentally impaired (WB and WHO, 2011). Rather than categorizing PWDs as a separate group, 
ICF treats disability as a continuum; “disability is a matter of more or less, not yes or no”. Thus, 
disability is a complex phenomenon reflecting the interaction between society and physical, 
sensory or mental features.  
                                                 
1
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PWDs experience barriers in accessing services that others take for granted; health care, 
education, employment, transport, information, etc. (WB and WHO, 2011). Disability is therefore 
an important development issue, but also increasingly seen as a human rights issue. The UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities emphasizes the view of PWDs as “actors” 
with rights rather than objects of charity and medical treatment; the social model of disability 
(UNCRPD, 2009). By empowering PWDs, they become active and contributing members of 
society (ACCION, 2010). 
In terms of making a living, becoming an entrepreneur
2
 is often the most likely prospect for 
PWDs as well as non-PWDs in Uganda (Balunywa, 2011). Micro entrepreneurs in developing 
countries generally face a number of constraints on business growth (Berge, Bjorvatn, and 
Tungodden, 2011). However, being an entrepreneur with disabilities often implies additional 
challenges, i.e. physical, sensory, and psychological barriers. For instance, getting a loan from a 
Microfinance Institution (MFI) can be difficult due to physical barriers, like MFI offices that are 
inaccessible to those who are unable to climb stairs (Bwire, Mukasa, and Mersland., 2009). 
Moreover, lack of information in Braille, the writing system for the blind, might constitute a 
sensory barrier. Attitudes within society could be a psychological barrier to entrepreneurship. The 
social identity is shaped by common attitudes, for example the view that PWDs are not capable of 
accomplishing anything. In that way, social identity might create internal or external barriers. 
Prejudices might constitute an external barrier. For example, credit officers might intentionally or 
unintentionally exclude PWDs by refusing to give a loan to a PWD who is actually capable of 
having one (Bwire et al., 2009). Internal barriers might exist because PWDs, more often than non-
PWDs, are exposed to exclusion and rejection in everyday life. Negative experiences might cause 
secondary incapacities like lack of self-confidence. Bwire et al. (2009) suggest that low self-
confidence and exclusion by staff are the main problems when it comes to mainstreaming PWDs 
into MFIs. However, they affirm there is a lack of evidence-based insights regarding exclusion 
mechanisms. 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) indirectly targets PWDs as they are over-represented 
among the poorest people in developing countries, and thus definitely a part of the vulnerable 
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 An entrepreneur is “a person who makes money by starting or running businesses, especially when this involves 
taking financial risks” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2005). 
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group (HI and CMB, 2006). Initially only a few PRSPs considered PWDs, but the number is 
increasing. Experience suggests that whenever the specific exclusion mechanisms and the specific 
needs of PWDs are not explicitly identified, such strategies and programs miss their specific 
target (ILO, 2002).  However, including PWDs as an explicitly defined group might have 
negative consequences if it highlights a negative stereotype about PWDs. Thus, more research is 
needed to make microfinance inclusive, particularly research on social identity, to find out 
whether directly targeting PWDs is detrimental or not. 
The World Report on Disability documents the current situation for PWDs and gives 
recommendations aiming at improving their lives (WB and WHO, 2011). Implementation is 
dependent on a broad range of stakeholders. National governments are suggested to have the most 
important role, but other stakeholders are highlighted as well. One could argue that the failure of 
governments puts more responsibility on other stakeholders. 
This paper aims at gaining a better understanding of the barriers facing PWDs in Uganda; 
particularly barriers to business. Understanding barriers will enable the implementation of more 
efficient countermeasures. The main focus of this paper is mindsets, referring to a person’s 
established set of attitudes. Attitudes relevant to entrepreneurship are willingness to compete, 
self-confidence, risk and time preferences, prejudices, social norms, etc. Of particular interest is 
the study of the social identity of PWDs, i.e. stereotypes associated with disability. Also, potential 
gender differences will be investigated, as females often are stereotyped as less talented or less 
competitive than males.  
The analysis is based on data from a lab experiment. A lab experiment enables investigation of 
causality in a controlled environment, and the use of a control group and randomization 
eliminates threats to the internal validity. The social identity of PWDs is studied through the use 
of priming, i.e. making a particular social identity salient in the treatment group, whereas the 
control group is neutral in that sense. The treatment group and the control group are then 
compared to examine the stereotypes associated with disability. 
The thesis offers two main findings. First, priming increases the self-confidence of PWDs, 
contrary to the expectations. This is probably due to a selection effect, since all participants have a 
relatively high level of education; the participants with disabilities are arguably more empowered 
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than the average person with disabilities in Uganda. The effect of priming on confidence is 
stronger for female PWDs, probably because female PWDs are less confident than male PWDs. 
Second, people (both with and without disabilities) generally believe that PWDs perform worse 
than non-PWDs, although they actually perform equally well. The results suggest that prejudice is 
a key barrier to entrepreneurship among PWDs, and that PWDs have internalized the social norms 
of inferiority. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the literature 
on social identity. Section 3 gives a description of the context in which the lab experiment was 
carried out. Section 4 presents the hypotheses and section 5 describes the sampling procedures 
and samples. Section 6 outlines the methodology and contains data on the treatment-control 
balance. Section 7 gives an overview of the experimental design. Section 8 provides details on the 
variables before presenting the results and finally a summary of the hypothesis testing. Section 9 
discusses and concludes. 
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2 SOCIAL IDENTITY: A LITERATURE OVERVIEW  
2.1 Theoretical Literature 
Social identity is the portion of an individual’s self-concept derived from perceived membership 
in a relevant social group (Turner and Oakes, 1986). Social norms are the rules specifying which 
values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that are appropriate for members of a specific social group 
(New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008). The norms might as well include physical 
characteristics or other characteristics describing a group ideal (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). 
Identity depends on the social status of the group, and the extent to which an individual’s 
characteristics and behavior match the social norms. 
2.1.1 Social Identity and Economic Preferences 
Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland (2010) use a theoretical framework to explain how social 
identities prescribe people’s behavior, by identifying the behavioral effects of the associated 
social norms on risk aversion and time preferences. The self-categorization theory is taken as 
given since Turner and Onorato (1999), among others, have tested the theory’s validity. There are 
numerous different social identities that a perceiver may invoke in everyday life and self-
categorization follows when a certain identity becomes salient. The salience of a social identity is 
determined by the other social groups that are present and comparable in any given context 
(Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994). 
In order to reveal ethnic, racial and gender norms, some participants are exposed to priming 
(Benjamin et al., 2010). Priming refers to the activation of knowledge structures by the current 
situational context (Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, 1996). Priming is used to elicit social identities; 
by temporarily making a certain social identity salient, a person’s behavior is presumed to tilt 
more towards the associated norms (Benjamin et al., 2010). In other words, the person acts more 
like the stereotype. A stereotype is a set of beliefs about the characteristics or attributes of a group 
(Judd and Park, 1993). 
The marginal effect of a specific social identity is identified by observing how behavior differs 
between primed and unprimed participants, i.e. the treatment group and the control group 
(Benjamin et al., 2010). Importantly, the salience of an identity must be varied randomly, so that 
the treatment group and the control group are basically similar; on average, the only difference 
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should be the treatment. In practice, the treatment group is primed by answering a background 
survey containing other questions than the background survey handed out to the control group. 
For example, the questionnaire making ethnic identity salient include questions about languages 
spoken by the participant, and how many generations the subjects’ family has lived in the United 
States. In the control questionnaire participants are asked ethnicity-neutral questions, like 
questions about the school meal plan and cable television subscription. 
An individual belongs to a social category C with strength s ≥ 0 and chooses the action x to 
maximize utility 
          ))     )
     )     )
 .  
The preferred action in the absence of identity considerations is x0, whereas the appropriate action 
according to the social norms is xC.. The weight placed on the social category in decision making 
is w(s). The first-order condition gives the optimal action 
    )  (     ))      )    
Disutility is caused by deviation from the norm and is increasing in s; the stronger feeling of 
affiliation, the closer the optimal action is to the social norm. Priming of social category C 
induces a shock to the optimal action by affecting the strength of group identification. 
Consequently, the optimal action moves closer to the norm. Thus, priming reveals the marginal 
behavioral effect of making a specific identity salient and is therefore a useful experimental 
method for studying how identity affects preferences. Understanding how preferences are affected 
by identity helps understanding how economic outcomes might differ between two social groups. 
In Benjamin et al. (2010), the observed variables are the degree of risk aversion and the degree of 
impatient behavior. These preferences are often decisive for long-term economic decisions. The 
study of ethnic identity includes American participants of both Asian and white descent. The 
behavior of primed Asians (whites) is compared to the behavior of unprimed Asians (whites). 
Hence, comparisons are made between those with similar background in order to isolate the 
behavioral effect of identity. Priming of ethnicity causes Asians to make more patient choices. 
The results suggest that social identity has a significant impact on economic preferences. Hence, 
emphasizing certain social identities in the moment of decision could be of great importance. 
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2.1.2 Social Identity and Economic Interaction 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) examine how identity affects economic outcomes by including 
identity in a utility function. Utility depends on identity, the individual’s actions, and others’ 
actions. Hence, limitations of the identity choice might be an important determinant of economic 
well-being. Individual actions might not only affect utility directly, but also through the effect on 
identity. Social differences might change over time, because actions can possibly alter norms, the 
set of social groups, and the social status of each group. 
In Akerlof and Kranton (2000), identity is based on social difference. Utility from actions 
depends on both standard preferences and identity. There are two social categories, Green and 
Red. All individuals have a taste for either Activity One (A1) or Activity Two (A2), regardless of 
the categories. According to the norms, a Green should engage in A1 and a Red in A2, which 
means that no one is considered a true Green if engaging in A2. One earns utility for choosing the 
activity matching one’s taste, but no utility for choosing the other activity. In a standard model 
utility maximization is equivalent with choosing the activity one has a taste for. However, the 
utility-maximizing choice might be altered when taking identity-based preferences into account. 
According to psychodynamic theory, utility losses occur when internalized norms are violated 
because violation causes anxiety. A person refrains from the preferred activity if the anxiety is 
severe enough. Moreover, externalities occur since other people’s identity is linked to the norms 
that are violated; violations threaten their identity. 
Individual behavior depends on the situation; who are interacting with each other and in what 
context. The most realistic case is interaction between various identities. Conflicts often arise 
because people with different identities meet. For example, Reds are angered by the fact that 
others fit into the dominant group, i.e. the Greens, while Greens are angered by Reds’ behavior. 
However, A2 could confirm the red identity like A1 confirms the green identity. 
2.1.2.1 Social exclusion 
Consider a community where Reds are people belonging to a group that is not accepted by the 
dominant group. Those who are socially excluded although trying to be a Green, suffer a loss in 
green identity. Those who are not trying to adjust to the green norms and rather choose the red 
identity do not suffer this loss. Reds can never fully fit the ideal Green, and their attempts to fit in 
are often associated with ambivalence and limited success. Pain and anger comes with the 
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learning of not being a “true” Green, so the excluded group might respond by choosing the 
oppositional red identity. The prevalence of the red identity and behavior A2 is determined by 
social interaction and the extent of social exclusion. As long as the loss in green identity, caused 
by exclusion, is larger than the difficulty of being a Red in a “green” community, some people 
will adopt the red identity. Lack of economic opportunities might increase the probability of 
making that choice. 
From the Greens’ point of view, Reds often make bad economic decisions. A1 can be thought of 
as “working” and A2 as “not working”. Instead of suffering the guilt of a failed provider, a man 
might choose to abandon his own family, starting a so-called “new” life as a criminal drug addict. 
However, his choice imposes monetary externalities on the abandoned mother and child, as well 
as those working; they have to contribute more when others fail to raise income.  
2.1.2.2 Self-destructive behavior 
The red behavior is “self-destructive”. Self-destruction includes attitudes like not attempting to 
reach one’s ambitions because one is not able to accomplish them perfectly.3 It also comprises 
making other people responsible for one’s life by blaming them, and having an attitude of 
helplessness; like one has no opportunity to manage one’s own life. The model used in Akerlof 
and Kranton (2000) captures self-destructive behavior, unlike standard economic models where 
such behavior is classified as irrationality. Rather, it is the consequence of a high degree of social 
exclusion. The higher social exclusion, the higher is the probability of equilibriums in which 
individuals refrain from profitable activities. 
2.1.2.3 Affirmative action 
“Affirmative action” means positive steps taken to increase the representation of those who have 
historically been excluded from employment, education, or business (Fullinwider, 2009). The 
effects of affirmative action on social exclusion might vary (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). 
Portraying the socially excluded as victims, which is necessary to maintain affirmative action 
programs, is costly for the target group. In that case, social exclusion rather increases the 
awareness of social differences. Hence, legal equality does not necessarily eliminate social 
exclusion. Exclusion persists if some people decide to be Red because Greens continue excluding 
                                                 
3
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9 
 
those who violate the social norms of Greens. On the other hand, affirmative action decreases 
social exclusion to the extent programs are seen as an apology for previous discrimination. In that 
case, it is perceived as an invitation for the excluded to become a part of the dominant culture.  
2.2 Empirical Literature 
2.2.1 Stereotype Threat 
Hoff and Pandey (2006) study the effect of social identity in village India, where a randomized 
experiment with both high-castes and low-castes is carried out. The objective of the experiments 
is to identify how societal discrimination affects individual performance, and why discrimination 
persists even after legal barriers are removed. Members of the lowest caste, outcasts, have 
historically been denied political and civil rights and had limited economic opportunities. De jure 
discrimination ended in 1947, but de facto discrimination still exists. 
The theory of stereotypes states that individual performance is affected by stereotype-based 
expectations. Stereotype threat refers to being at risk of confirming a negative stereotype about 
one’s social group as a self-characteristic (Steele & Aronson, 1995). The possibility of confirming 
negative stereotypes about one’s group generates anxiety as long as the tasks accomplished are 
related to ability (Benjamin, 2009). Another possible effect of stereotyping is stereotype lift, 
referring to a situation where the performance is improved by making negative stereotypes about 
other groups salient. 
In Hoff and Pandey (2006), the treatment group differs from the control group in that one’s caste 
is publicly revealed; the treatment is priming of social categories. Mazes are solved in groups, but 
participants are paid in accordance to individual performance. There are two different treatment 
groups; one with both high-caste and low-caste individuals, and segregated groups where the 
individuals are either low-castes or high-castes. 
Outcasts perform as well as high-castes individuals when information about one’s caste is not 
revealed. However, they perform worse when caste identity is made salient even though the 
information about castes is irrelevant to payoffs and the tasks are not advantageous to any of the 
groups. Interestingly, segregation lowers high-caste performance. A possible explanation is that 
mixing of castes causes high-caste individuals to focus on their social status rather than efforts. 
Thus, if their focus on negative stereotypes about low-castes is the reason for their outclassing, 
10 
 
these results constitute evidence of stereotype lift. The underperformance of low-castes in the 
treatment group supports the stereotype threat hypothesis. Negative thoughts about oneself affect 
one’s behavior, which means that the identity is likely to affect learning and willingness to bet on 
own success. Thus, discrimination also influences a group’s ability to respond to economic 
opportunities.  
Furthermore, Hoff and Pandey (2006) examine why behavioral effects prevail although the 
discriminating law was removed in 1947. When there is a law discriminating a certain social 
group, citizens might perceive discrimination as legitimate and internalize these values. Hence, 
given that identity influences behavior, de facto discrimination will persist even after 
opportunities have been equalized across groups, because internalized norms are rigid. 
Cadinua, Maass, Rosabianca, and Kiesner (2005) find evidence that negative thinking is a 
potential mediator of performance deficits under stereotype threat, and that the effect on 
performance might be delayed because the performance deficit is caused by the accumulation of 
negative thoughts. 
2.2.2 Statistical and Taste-Based Discrimination 
Hedegaard and Tyran (2011) suggest that ethnic prejudice can lead to discrimination in the 
workplace for two reasons. First, prejudice might be driven by animus, i.e. intense dislike, and 
therefore result in “taste-based” discrimination. Second, prejudice can be driven by false beliefs 
about an ethnic group and thus result in inaccurate “statistical” discrimination.  
Statistical discrimination occurs when the decision maker lacks information about the individual 
productivity of job candidates and therefore makes a decision based on beliefs about a group’s 
average productivity. Accurate statistical discrimination (ASD) is present if the average 
productivity is accurate. ASD does not involve a price of prejudice, defined as earnings forgone 
by choosing a less productive worker. Inaccurate statistical discrimination occurs whenever the 
decision maker has false beliefs about a group’s average productivity. 
Discrimination could also be driven by taste. For example, the employer knows that the minority 
group is, on average, more productive than the majority group. Still, a majority worker is hired 
because the employer dislikes minority workers. 
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Hedegaard and Tyran (2011) carry out a new type of field experiment in Denmark by controlling 
for beliefs and the price of prejudice. The decision makers are not aware that they are part of an 
experiment. In the first treatment group, the decision makers have knowledge about the ethnicity 
and productivity of all candidates. It implies that only animus can cause discrimination; taste-
based discrimination can be isolated and then be used to obtain an estimate of belief-driven 
prejudice. The price of prejudice is varied randomly by giving decision makers the choice 
between candidates of different productivities. Thus, they can estimate how price changes affect 
taste-based discrimination. In the second treatment group, decision makers do not have any 
information about individual productivity. Decision makers have to form beliefs about the 
average productivity of ethnic groups; both animus-driven and belief-driven prejudice can cause 
discrimination. 
ASD fails to explain which workers are actually hired by a company; in addition to the earnings 
forgone due to ASD, decision makers give up about 4 percent of earnings. By obtaining estimates 
of both animus-based and belief-based prejudice, Hedegaard and Tyran (2011) investigate the 
extent to which animus and false beliefs explain the gap between ASD and observed behavior. At 
least 40 percent of this earnings gap is explained by animus-driven prejudice alone, while at most 
33 percent is explained by belief-driven prejudice. Thus, part of the price is paid intentionally, 
whereas part of it is paid unintentionally as a result of biased beliefs. Evidence suggests that taste-
based discrimination is common even at a substantial price and that it is surprisingly responsive to 
the price. Thus, the results indicate that policies aiming at increasing the price of prejudice might 
be effective. 
2.2.3 Automatic Prejudice 
Uhlmann, Brescoll, and Paluck (2006) study automatic prejudice, defined as negative automatic 
associations with a target group. Thus, prejudice can occur without having any intentions of being 
condescending. White Americans automatically associate African Americans with negativity. 
Such automatic associations could reflect personal or social attitudes, irrational biases, or 
perceptions of minority members as bad or badly off. Uhlman et al. (2006) focus on the last issue. 
They consider the possibility that negative associations are partly caused by egalitarian 
associations acknowledging that the minority group is discriminated against. For example, whites 
associate African Americans with oppression, maltreatment, and victimization.  
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A prejudiced attitude could be “African Americans are lazy and violent”. Despite the fact that 
whites reject prejudiced attitudes, implicit measures reveal prejudice. Implicit measures have been 
conclusively shown to predict biased behavior against minority groups. They use the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT), where the participants are asked to answer which category a certain word 
belongs to, for example linking “bad” to either “white” or “black” (Nosek, Greewald, and Banaji, 
2007). Quick responses are interpreted as being stronger associations in memory. 
The participants have more positive associations with European Americans than African 
Americans (Uhlmann et al., 2006). Moreover, they strongly associate European Americans with 
privilege and African Americans with oppression. In fact, oppression is more strongly associated 
with African Americans than the word “bad”. The results suggest that automatic prejudice partly 
results from associating members of low status groups with unfair circumstances. The same 
experiment is done with two fictional groups, Noffians and Fasites. Participants are randomly 
assigned to different treatments. The first treatment group is conditioned to associate Noffians 
with words related to oppression and Fasite with words related to privilege, whereas the second 
treatment implies the opposite. The results are unchanged; associating a fictional group with 
oppression also leads to more negative automatic associations on the IAT test, while self-reported 
prejudices do not increase. 
The findings suggest that negative automatic associations stem from both egalitarian and 
prejudiced attitudes. Negativity might not reflect dislike in every case; people might for instance 
have an immediate negative reaction because they dislike inequality. However, evidence suggests 
that negative automatic associations contribute to prejudiced behavior. 
2.2.4 Reducing Intergroup Prejudice 
Paluck (2009) investigates whether it is possible to affect personal beliefs, perceptions of social 
norms, and behavior through mass media. Beliefs are defined as understandings of self and 
environment (Bem, 1970). A randomized field experiment is carried out in Rwanda, where the 
radio played a key role in a civil war that caused the deaths of around 75 percent of an ethnic 
minority; the Tutsi (Paluck, 2009). Radio is still the most important form of mass media in 
Rwanda. 10 years after the genocide, a yearlong radio soap opera aims at reconciliation by 
broadcasting messages about prejudice, violence, and trauma. A control group listens to a radio 
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program where entertainment and educational messages about reproductive health and AIDS are 
intertwined. 
After the experiment a research team conducted individual interviews, focus groups, and 
behavioral observations. The reconciliation radio program did not change listeners’ personal 
beliefs, but substantially influenced their perceptions of social norms. Thus, it might be better to 
target social norms rather than personal beliefs. However, norms might not impact behavior 
significantly on a large scale unless the norms are made salient in a particular situation (Kallgren, 
Reno, and Cialdini, 2000). 
2.2.5 Time Preferences and Trust 
According to Leigh (1986), three of the strongest correlates of delayed gratification are 
socioeconomic background, race, and achievements in school. Low time preference is equivalent 
to patience; a person values spending a specific amount of money in present time less than 
spending a specific higher amount in the future. Hence, individuals with low time preferences 
value savings more than individuals with high time preferences due to a lower implicit discount 
rate. Empirical evidence indicates that females have lower time preferences, i.e. they are more 
patient (Castillo, 2011). 
Trusting that the delayed reward will actually come is crucial for having low time preferences. 
The trust could be weaker or absent in poor households, because the poor generally have fewer 
productive years due to greater chance of early death or unemployment etc. However, according 
to the human capital view, wealth is a result of low time preferences; not the other way around 
(Leigh, 1986). 
The most credible explanation why race is correlated to time preferences is the psychological 
effect of racial discrimination on trust, i.e. victims of discrimination tend to have less trust. 
Children performing well in school have been willing to delay playing in order to achieve good 
grades. Thus, educational achievement is the effect of deferred gratification, not the cause. 
2.2.6 Attitude to Risk and Willingness to Compete 
Evidence suggests that there is a correlation between attitude to risk and time preference 
(Anderhub, Guth, Gneezy, and Sonsino, 2001). In addition to time preference itself, the discount 
rate is affected by the time horizon; the longer time horizon, the higher discount rate due to 
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increased risk of loss caused by unexpected events. The main finding is that risk-averse 
individuals tend to discount the future more heavily, suggesting that they are more inclined to 
make short-sighted decisions. Risk lovers and those who have low time preferences are more 
likely to be willing to compete (Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2011). 
2.2.7 Altruism 
Social entrepreneurship is an altruistic form of capitalism (Tan, Williams, and Tan, 2005). 
Altruism implies caring more about other people’s needs and happiness than one’s own (Oxford 
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2005). Social entrepreneurs aim at benefiting society, whereas 
the standard goal of business people is presumed to be maximization of individual profits (Tan et 
al., 2005). However, there are different degrees of altruism; some social entrepreneurs aim at 
profiting society only, while others aim at profiting both society and themselves. The weight 
placed on society determines how willing an entrepreneur is to risk foregone profits or even loss. 
Hence, the greater weight placed on society, the more altruistic is the entrepreneur. 
Simmons and Emanuele (2007) analyze a dataset on donations and volunteering and predict that 
females donate more of both money and time. The results suggest that females are more altruistic 
than males. 
2.2.8 Fairness 
In some cases there is consensus that fairness requires equality (Almås, Cappelen, Salvanes, 
Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2010). However, people often disagree on what is fair because they 
have different opinions on whether individual achievements, luck, or maximization of total 
benefits justify inequalities. Almås et al. (2010) investigate children’s fairness views, assuming 
that children make a trade-off between self-interest and fairness. They find that the degree of 
selfishness does not change over the years, whereas older participants are much more likely to 
view inequalities caused by various individual achievements as fair. 
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3 CONTEXT 
3.1 Disability in Uganda 
38 percent of Ugandans live on less than $1.25 a day,
4
 while more than 80 percent of PWDs live 
under this poverty line.
5
 Access to important services is limited for PWDs and many of them are 
not aware of their rights and potentials (Kangere, 2003).  
Historically, PWDs were objects of charity and institutionalization, a practice that started in the 
era of colonization and was widespread in the 1950 and 60’s (Kangere, 2003). Religious and 
charity organizations considered it as doing PWDs a favor; their basic needs were covered by 
keeping them in institutions, in contrast to the needs of beggars on the street. Nonetheless, PWDs 
were locked up whenever it was considered necessary in order to protect society.  
Unfortunately, this is not just the dark past. The 21
st
 century has seen PWDs being abused and 
locked up due to the shame of having a disabled child.
6
 PWDs are isolated from society as a result 
of dependency on charitable organizations and other people’s fear of disabilities. Integration into 
society is crucial in order to make PWDs reach their full potential. Integration must be based on 
human rights and social justice.
6
 Empowerment might enable them to get out of poverty and 
contribute to the economic development of Uganda. According to Bwire et al. (2009), improving 
the services of PWDs is not about developing special credit products or giving special conditions, 
but rather ensuring access to all mainstream services. Likewise, the World Report on Disability 
emphasizes mainstreaming, although the report suggests investment in specific programs and 
services for those who are in need. 
3.1.1 Progress and Limitations 
Organizations of PWDs have a strong position in Uganda and have been influential in legislation 
and policy processes (Øderud, Brodtkorb, and Hotchkiss, 2004). The National Union of Disabled 
Persons of Uganda (NUDIPU) is a non-governmental umbrella organization, established in 1987. 
The founders of NUDIPU aimed at breaking the tradition of treating PWDs as charity objects.
7
 
NUDIPU’s mission is to promote equalization of opportunities and active participation of PWDs 
                                                 
4
 http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp (09.01.12)  
5
 http://www.nhf.no/index.asp?id=73455 (20.09.11)  
6
 http://www.idealist.org/view/org/N5HNC9TzWnH4/ (20.09.11) 
7
 http://www.nudipu.org.ug/history.php (28.09.11) 
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in mainstream development processes. NUDIPU’s work has yielded significant results over the 
years. First, PWDs are nowadays involved in the planning and implementation of programs meant 
to benefit them. Second, disability sensitive provisions now exist in the National Constitution and 
several Parliamentary Acts. 
The achievements of organizations of PWDs generate an advantageous environment for changing 
and improving the lives of PWDs. However, there is a long way to go before the achievements 
have had significant practical impact on the living conditions of PWDs (Øderud et al., 2004). 
Laws guaranteeing the rights of PWDs do not necessarily make a difference in real life. 
Implementation problems are particularly widespread in rural areas; living in rural Uganda means 
limited access to services and other initiatives intended for this group.
8
 More than 60 percent of 
PWDs have never taken part in rehabilitation programs that could have facilitated integration into 
society. 
3.1.2 Prejudices 
Many Ugandans do not know what disability is and often perceive it as a curse.
9
 Women giving 
birth to a child with disabilities are viewed as bad wives and are sometimes made victims of 
family violence. With this in mind, it is no wonder that lack of self-confidence is common among 
PWDs. They often face unfair treatment. For example, some deaf students were caned because 
they did not follow the instructions, but in fact, they were not able to hear what the teacher said.
9
 
Another example is a student with physical impairments being late at school because he could not 
manage to walk faster. Transport is expensive, so most people with physical impairments do not 
have a wheelchair; and starting to walk earlier in the morning, when it is dark, could be 
dangerous. The teacher punished him by letting him stand outside the classroom for a while, 
although he was already exhausted after walking several kilometers. The other students laughed at 
him when he was finally allowed to enter the classroom. 
Two young men were trained as carpenters at a vocational training center for the deaf.
10
 The 
furniture they made looked just like any other beautiful furniture. One of the carpenters said that 
people did not believe that they were able to accomplish anything at all. Few people came to see 
                                                 
8
 http://www.nudipu.org.ug/history.php (28.09.11) 
9
 Interview with Joel Kawanguzi, NUDIPU, 04.11.11 
10
 Interview at Vocational Training Center for the Deaf, Uganda Society for the Deaf, 14.04.11 
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their products, so they had to go to town to search for potential customers. It was challenging not 
being able to talk, but he wrote on a piece of paper to his customers. The other carpenter told that 
it was hard to compete, because the deaf did not get the same agreements as others. The most 
common way of getting customers was through friends contacting their friends. He usually 
brought photos to show potential customer what he could manage. However, many people did not 
believe that he was the one making the furniture, apparently because he was deaf. These real-life 
stories emphasize that prejudices against PWDs might hinder entrepreneurial success. 
3.1.3 The School System and Dropout Rates 
After finishing primary education and ordinary level of secondary school (O-level), students can 
choose between advanced level (A-level) and vocational training.
11
 A-level is mandatory if one 
wants to go for further studies at the university. 
Primary school enrollment rates have increased rapidly in Uganda in recent years. This is 
probably the result of the Government declaring the policy of Universal Primary Education (UPE) 
in 1997 (Sabates, Akyeampong, Westbrook, and Hunt, 2010). Today, the Government offers free 
primary education to four children per family and the political achievements are viewed as 
successful by many people. Nevertheless, the free education often implies sending the children to 
a poor school, where the pupil to teacher ratio is too high to facilitate learning. Besides, parents 
still have to pay for books, uniforms, etc. Many children are registered in schools, but fail to learn 
(Little, 2008). They are enrolled for several years, but fail to progress and drop out from school. 
In fact, Uganda has the second highest primary school dropout rate in Sub-Saharan Africa; the 
rate is 68 percent for all seven grades (UNESCO, 2011). 
Several schools cannot take care of pupils with special needs. The Government focuses on the 
number of children enrolled in school, not individual adaptation.  Children from the poorest 20 
percent of households are more than twice as likely to drop out as children from the wealthiest 
households (UNESCO, 2011). The share of PWDs who never fulfill their education is four times 
as high as for the general population.
12
 The situation is even worse for women. Dropout is a major 
problem among PWDs and exclusion from education means that PWDs are excluded from the 
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 http://www.salveinternational.org/id5.html (20.09.11) 
12
 http://www.nhf.no/index.asp?id=73455 (20.09.11) 
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authorities’ programs for poverty mitigation (UNESCO, 2011). Thus, school dropouts make 
PWDs even more vulnerable. 
3.2 Females in Ugandan Society 
Like females in most countries, females in Ugandan society face challenges. They might not be as 
free as males and are often portrayed as a vulnerable group. Females have traditionally been 
economically dependent on males, a circumstance limiting the opportunities females have to 
claim their rights. Although a country officially condemns violation of human rights, it takes time 
to turn the principles into reality. Customary laws often favor males, for instance when it comes 
to education. The UPE program emphasizes equal access to education for all, and the proportion 
of girls in lower levels of education is almost equal to the proportion of boys.
13
 However, it is 
remarkably lower in higher levels of education, because families traditionally favor educating 
their boys when facing financial constraints. The inferior position of females possibly makes 
problems related to self-confidence more severe among females than males. 
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 http://www.afrol.com/Categories/Women/profiles/uganda_women.htm#gendersensitivity (07.01.12) 
19 
 
4 HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Time Preference and Trust 
Time preferences are important to entrepreneurship because willingness to invest in one’s own 
business requires low time preferences. The time preferences of PWDs depend on the extent to 
which they trust that a delayed reward will actually come. One could argue that PWDs in school 
must be surrounded by people they trust; they would not have come that far if family and friends 
were not supporting and encouraging them. However, it is probably insufficient for entrepreneurs 
to trust friends and family because investments are just as likely to involve unknown people. 
Besides, most PWDs come from poor families and have experienced discrimination. 
Discrimination in itself makes it less likely that PWDs have a lot of trust. Like the poor in 
general, PWDs often have fewer productive years because they are more likely to face health 
problems etc. 
The human capital view suggests that the lack of wealth of poor people is a consequence of their 
high time preferences, not the other way around.  However, the world is not black and white; 
some people are born and trapped in poverty. On a daily basis the poor people’s concern is getting 
enough food, so they do not have enough money to make investments anyway. Thus, lack of 
wealth is not necessarily a consequence of high time preferences, but rather financial constraints. 
Based on the fact that PWDs often face discrimination, the hypothesis is that PWDs have less 
trust in people and higher time preferences than non-PWDs. Considered the fact that females face 
more discrimination than males, one would expect females to have less trust and higher time 
preferences than males. However, the suggestions on time preferences are ambiguous as empirical 
evidence suggests that females are more patient than males. The fact that females usually have the 
main responsibility of taking care of children might be the reason for their patience, i.e. they have 
to save in order to pay for their children’s health care and education. The hypothesis is therefore 
that females are more patient than males, but have less trust; although it contradicts the link 
between trust and time preferences suggested by evidence. 
H1: PWDs are less patient than non-PWDs. 
H2: Females are more patient than males. 
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H3: PWDs have less trust than non-PWDs. 
H4: Females have less trust than males. 
4.2 Attitude to Risk 
Very risk-averse individuals do not become entrepreneurs simply because businesses are risky; 
one needs a bit of luck as well as entrepreneurial skills to succeed. Betting on one’s own success 
is considered more risky if one lacks self-confidence. Discrimination and social exclusion 
probably make PWDs less confident because they are viewed as incapable. Thus, PWDs are 
perhaps less willing to take the risks associated with running a business. Not trusting that a 
delayed reward will come implies being less willing to make an investment, because the risk is 
perceived as high. Thus, compared to non-PWDs, lack of both trust and self-confidence is likely 
to make PWDs less willing to take risk. Female PWDs might be even more risk averse as they are 
more likely to have confidence issues. 
H5: PWDs are more risk averse than non-PWDs. 
H6: Females are more risk averse than males. 
4.3 Willingness to Compete 
Willingness to compete is crucial to entrepreneurship due to a competitive environment. Non-
PWDs might not view PWDs as equals no matter how successful their businesses are, i.e. if there 
are social norms stating that it is not appropriate for a PWD to be an entrepreneur. In that case, 
PWDs are less likely to be willing to compete; they might prefer being beggars or objects of 
charity rather than a failed entrepreneur. Social exclusion might cause PWDs to choose 
oppositional identities rather than suffering inevitable personal defeat. Thus, PWDs might refrain 
from profitable activities and in doing so they choose a self-destructive behavior. Prejudices 
might hinder PWDs from attempting to reach their ambitions because they are not able to 
accomplish them perfectly.  PWDs are expected to be less willing to compete due to the existence 
of social norms, because these norms limit the apparently appropriate behavior for PWDs and 
cause prejudices and social exclusion. Besides, low self-confidence is likely to have a negative 
effect on PWDs’ willingness to enter into entrepreneurial competition. Female PWDs are 
probably even less willing to compete; their inferior position in Ugandan society is likely to have 
a negative effect on self-confidence, and there seem to be stronger prejudices against females than 
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males. The hypothesis is in accordance with evidence suggesting that risk lovers and those with 
low time preferences are more willing to compete. 
H7: PWDs are less willing than non-PWDs to compete. 
H8: Females are less willing than males to compete. 
4.4 Altruism 
Altruistic preferences can affect entrepreneurial behavior; social entrepreneurs might risk profits 
because they aim at benefiting society through their business. Based on the assumption that 
family and friends often help a PWD without requiring reciprocity, PWDs in school are most 
likely surrounded by altruistic people. PWDs might value altruism more than non-PWDs as a 
consequence of being more dependent on other people. One might argue that PWDs are more 
likely than non-PWDs to be social entrepreneurs. For instance, PWDs might hire a PWD in case 
of business expansion in order to offer support to the most vulnerable, regardless of whether a 
PWD or non-PWD is the most productive applicant. Thus, PWDs are possibly more willing than 
non-PWDs to give up earnings because other people’s needs are more important than their own. 
Thus, the hypothesis is that PWDs are more altruistic than non-PWDs. Moreover, female PWDs 
are expected to be even more altruistic than male PWDs; consistent with evidence on altruism and 
gender. 
H9: PWDs are more altruistic than non-PWDs. 
H10: Females are more altruistic than males. 
4.5 Fairness 
Preferences for fairness are of importance because entrepreneurship is linked to the view that one 
should be rewarded according to one’s effort. Thus, if one thinks inequalities are unfair even 
though they result from different levels of efforts, one might not desire becoming an entrepreneur. 
PWDs are probably used to receiving more than obtained through efforts; a result of being 
dependent on family members or charity in general. On the other side, one might argue that 
PWDs becoming entrepreneurs are those who actually want to put efforts into generating income. 
Still, the disabilities might reduce the potential level of effort and the business income might not 
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be enough to cover all expenses; income from business is often spent on treatment.
14
 Thus, PWDs 
might be more inclined to view inequalities as unfair regardless of efforts and individual 
achievements, because PWDs need more funds than they can possibly acquire themselves. 
Females and males are expected to share fairness views. 
H11: PWDs are more inclined to view all inequalities as unfair regardless of individual 
performance. 
H12: Females and males are expected to share fairness views 
4.6 Performance 
Performance is one of the factors determining entrepreneurial success. One could argue that 
PWDs are expected to perform worse than non-PWDs due to lack of individual adaptation 
hindering the learning of PWDs. Also, lack of self-confidence can hamper performance; PWDs 
might try less hard to learn if they believe that they are incapable of learning anyway. However, 
PWDs reaching O-level have proved that they are capable of learning; at least enough to prevent 
dropout. The performance of PWDs might be altered when the social identity of PWDs is made 
salient. If low performance is stereotypical to PWDs, it is likely that negative thoughts occur 
when PWDs are primed. Hence, regardless of whether PWDs perform worse than non-PWDs in 
general, the hypothesis is that the primed PWDs perform worse than unprimed PWDs, i.e. 
stereotype threat. If stereotype threat occurs, it is likely that this effect is even stronger under 
competition. Female PWDs are expected to perform worse than males because they have more 
issues regarding self-confidence and learning, due to parents favoring educating their boys, etc. 
Also, the effect of priming on PWDs is likely to be stronger for females as they are generally less 
confident. 
H13: Priming has a negative effect on the performance of PWDs. 
H14: Females perform worse than males. 
                                                 
14
 Interview with Joel Kawanguzi, NUDIPU, 04.11.11 
 
23 
 
4.7 Self-Confidence 
Entrepreneurs must be willing to bet on their own success, but it requires a certain level of 
confidence. PWDs are likely to have lower self-confidence than non-PWDs due to prejudices, 
unfair treatment, the common perception that PWDs cannot manage their own lives, and the 
superstition that disability is caused by a curse. The hypothesis is lack of confidence among 
PWDs as NUDIPU claims that it is a major problem. Females are likely to have even lower self-
confidence than males due to the inferior position in society. 
Self-confidence is related to personality, but PWDs reaching O-level might have higher self-
confidence than PWDs in general. However, if low self-confidence is stereotypical to PWDs and 
PWDs in school identify with this group, priming might reveal lower confidence among primed 
PWDs than unprimed PWDs, regardless of the initial level of confidence. Thus, priming is 
expected to decrease the self-confidence of PWDs. 
H15: PWDs are less confident than non-PWDs. 
H16: Priming has a negative effect on the confidence of PWDs. 
H17: Females are generally less confident than males.  
4.8 Prejudices and Inferiority 
Attitudes among non-PWDs are important because prejudices might hinder entrepreneurial 
success for PWDs. Evidence and experience suggest that non-PWDs have prejudices against 
PWDs. Non-PWDs might simply dislike PWDs, but they might also underestimate PWDs 
because they have false beliefs about their capacities. Although non-PWDs not necessarily 
express prejudices explicitly, there is a possibility that they automatically associate PWDs with 
negativity anyhow. Non-PWDs might have classmates with disabilities who disprove the 
assumption that anyone with disabilities fit the stereotype of PWDs, but they might just as well 
view them as exceptions rather than counter-evidence. So, the hypothesis is that non-PWDs have 
prejudices against PWDs. PWDs are likely to internalize the social norms causing the prejudices 
and PWDs are therefore expected to have beliefs of inferiority about themselves. 
H18: People have prejudices against PWDs. 
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5 THE PARTICIPANTS 
381 students from senior 2 or 3 participated in the lab experiment, of which 33 percent were 
PWDs and 52 percent females. On average, the participants were 16 years old, ranging from 12 to 
25. Students in the final years of education are potential entrepreneurs and therefore considered 
suitable participants. The reason for recruiting relatively young students was to avoid an even 
more selected group as the number of PWDs drops significantly from O-level to A-level
15
. Also, 
recruiting older students would have made it difficult to mobilize the desired amount of PWDs. 
The participating PWDs were either deaf or physically impaired; for practical reasons, the blind 
were not included in the lab experiment. 
5.1 Sampling Procedures 
The procedure of recruiting non-PWDs was randomly selecting schools from a list containing all 
secondary schools in Kampala. The mobilization was randomized in order to obtain a 
representative sample. Mobilizing only those schools eager to participate would have been 
problematic because they might be “special”, for instance concerning how they view PWDs. 
Many schools did not want to participate because they had a lot to catch up after a strike among 
teachers, and also because the lab experiment was in the examination period. However, when a 
school declined, it was recorded and a new school was randomly selected from the same list. 
Concerning PWDs, it would be impossible to use a randomization procedure and at the same time 
recruit the desired amount. There were few PWDs in each school and several schools did not have 
any PWDs at all; unless it was a school for children with special needs. It would be too costly to 
pick up only one or two students from a school far away from the venue or the other participating 
schools. Besides, transport of PWDs is more challenging in itself. Thus, the procedure of 
recruiting PWDs was mobilizing students from schools nearby the venue or along the planned 
transportation route. There would have been a selection problem concerning the recruiting of 
PWDs anyhow; even with a randomization procedure. PWDs in school constitute a selected group 
because most PWDs are excluded from education and the absence of randomization enabled 
recruiting a larger sample. Therefore, it was considered worth dropping randomization when 
recruiting PWDs, in order to reduce the threats to external validity. 
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All schools were from Kampala, except for Wakiso Secondary School for the Deaf from the 
neighboring district. In each session, Wakiso S.S. provided the necessary number of students, 
depending on the number of PWDs from other schools participating; this to ensure that the 
number of PWDs was approximately the same in all sessions. 
5.2 Samples 
All schools were informed that the sample should be representative and therefore not contain only 
the brightest students. Nonetheless, the samples of PWDs and non-PWDs might be quite 
different; for instance, PWDs might come from more resourceful families as it is uncommon for 
PWDs to be in school. It is important to investigate whether PWDs are significantly different 
from non-PWDs prior to the main analysis in section 8. 
Table 5-1: Background variables – by disability status 
 
 
(1) 
PWD 
(2) 
non-PWD 
(3)   
Difference 
Female 
 
0.396 
(0.491) 
0.576 
(0.495) 
-0.180*** 
(0.054) 
Live with both parents 
 
0.452 
(0.500) 
0.302 
(0.460) 
0.150*** 
(0.052) 
Age 
 
17.286 
(2.269) 
16.047 
(1.489) 
1.239*** 
(0.194) 
TV 
 
0.595 
(0.493) 
0.682 
(0.466) 
-0.087* 
(0.052) 
Computer 
 
0.127 
(0.334) 
0.126 
(0.332) 
0.001 
(0.036) 
Servants 
 
0.317 
(0.467) 
0.211 
(0.409) 
0.106** 
(0.047) 
Government employee 
 
0.190 
(0.394) 
0.090 
(0.287) 
0.100*** 
(0.036) 
Private company employee 0.190 
(0.394) 
0.156 
(0.364) 
0.034 
(0.041) 
Peasant 
 
0.198 
(0.400) 
0.164 
(0.372) 
0.034 
(0.042) 
Own business 
 
0.341 
(0.476) 
0.459 
(0.499) 
-0.118** 
(0.054) 
Note: (1) and (2) present the averages of PWDs and non-PWDs, respectively, and standard deviations in 
parentheses. (3) presents the differences between PWDs and non-PWDs and standard errors in parentheses; 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 5-1 provides descriptive statistics for the background variables by disability status. Column 
(1) presents averages of PWDs, column (2) averages of non-PWDs, and column (3) the 
differences between PWDs and non-PWDs. There are significantly fewer females in the PWD 
sample; 40 percent of PWDs are female, while 58 percent of non-PWDs are female. On average, 
the PWDs are one year older than non-PWDs. The significant difference possibly reflects that 
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PWDs more often than non-PWDs have problems completing a grade due to lack of individual 
adaptation, etc. 
PWDs are significantly more likely to live with both parents than non-PWDs. Living with both 
parents increases the probability that the family has two incomes; well-equipped to cover 
expenses related to school as well as treatment. On the other hand, it is rather common that only 
one parent has a job because of the high unemployment rate. However, if one parent is not 
working, it is more likely that the parents are able to groom their children, for instance helping out 
with homework. This is of great importance since PWDs generally are more dependent on family 
members due to impairments. Without supporting parents they would most likely drop out of 
school or perhaps not be enrolled in school at all. Thus, this finding suggests that PWDs come 
from more resourceful families. 
PWDs are less likely to have a TV at home. One could argue that this finding contradicts the 
hypothesis of resourceful families. However, whether or not one has a TV is not really a good 
measure of wealth because it is common for non-wealthy families in urban areas to have one as 
well. There are no differences between PWDs and non-PWDs concerning having a computer at 
home.  
32 percent of PWDs and 21 percent of non-PWDs report that they have servants at home and the 
difference is significant. One could argue that it supports the hypothesis that PWDs come from 
more resourceful families. On the other side, families containing PWDs might actually be in need 
of servants as PWDs often require more help at home. Hence, it might be a necessary priority 
rather than a symbol of wealth. 
The occupation of the head of household is not interesting in itself, but it could possibly say 
something about the families’ wealth as income differs across occupations. Public employees earn 
almost six times more than the average person in Africa (Therkildsen and Tidemand, 2007). 
Hence, public employees are likely to earn more than those having their own business, because 
most businesses are small and add little value (GoU, 2010). It is therefore of importance that the 
head of household in families containing PWDs is significantly more likely to be a government 
employee and less likely to own a business than in families not containing PWDs. There is no 
difference between PWDs and non-PWDs regarding the probability of head of household being a 
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peasant or private company employee. These results suggest that PWDs come from more 
resourceful families. 
The majority of the findings in Table 5-1 support the hypothesis that PWDs come from more 
resourceful families. Although PWDs in school are the elite among PWDs, and probably have 
access to more resources, it is relevant to compare them to non-PWDs at the same school level. 
Considered the fact that many PWDs are excluded from education, comparing PWDs and non-
PWDs with equivalent access to resources implies comparing two groups that are not equally 
likely to become entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, when the purpose is making inference about the 
social identity of PWDs, PWDs cannot be compared to non-PWDs. If doing so, one ignores the 
possibility that the results are driven by other fundamental differences between PWDs and non-
PWDs, rather than social identities. However, priming can solve this problem as it enables 
comparison of primed PWDs and unprimed PWDs, i.e. two groups that are essentially similar.  
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6 METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Lab Experiment 
A lab experiment enables investigation of causality in a controlled environment. By randomly 
assigning participants to a treatment or control group and comparing the two groups, one can 
make inference about the treatment effect. The reason is that the treatment group and the control 
group are exposed to the same external influence (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2009). Thus, 
the only explanation for changes to the dependent variable is the treatment itself, not the group 
composition or other external factors. Thus, the use of a control group and randomization 
procedures eliminates threats to the internal validity. 
There are three main disadvantages of experimental methods. First, the findings might differ from 
what one would find in a natural setting. Second, the participants might not be representative to 
the general population. These issues make it harder to prove external validity, i.e. the extent to 
which the results can be generalized. As long as the selection is representative, the threats to 
external validity decrease as the number of observations increases. Third, experimenter demand 
effects occur when the participants form an interpretation of the experiment’s purpose and 
unconsciously change their behavior accordingly (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 2009). For example, 
they might express views that are thought to be politically correct rather than their true opinions. 
However, the use of a control group increases the confidence that the results are not artifacts of 
experimental design (Paluck, 2009). 
The participants are incentivized by money to make clear that the goal is to perform as well as 
possible (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). This practice is based on the assumption that monetary 
payments induce participants to put their best efforts into completion of the tasks in the lab 
experiment. 
6.2 Priming 
In practice, the priming was done by giving the treatment group three questionnaires and 
exercises that were different from the ones received by the control group; equivalent to the 
procedure in Benjamin et al. (2010). These non-incentivized tasks were handed out three times 
during a session in order to maintain the effect, because the duration of the priming effect is 
limited (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, and Steele, 2001). 
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The first non-incentivized handout was a questionnaire about entrepreneurship. First, all 
participants were asked a few general questions, like Does your mother/guardian own a business? 
These questions were followed by either questions intended to prime the participant or neutral 
questions. The treatment questionnaire contained questions like What would be the greatest 
challenge for you if you were to open a business? and Do you like hard physical work? On the 
contrary, neutral questions could be What is the most common type of small business in Uganda? 
and Who is the most famous Ugandan business person? 
The second non-incentivized handout was about school and leisure, including general questions 
like In which area is your school located? and Are the teachers at your school mainly males or 
females? Examples from the treatment questionnaire are Does your parents/guardians or other 
family members assist you in any way with your school work? and Do you enjoy doing sports? 
The neutral questionnaire included questions like What are the neighboring countries of Uganda? 
and What is your favorite soft drink? 
The last treatment was not a questionnaire, but rather a language exercise. All participants were 
asked to construct four-word sentences by reorganizing five words, which did not make any sense 
the way it was organized originally. The handouts differed in that most of the words the treatment 
group had at hand were related to disability or health in general, while the words presented to the 
control group were neutral in that sense. In the treatment group one could reorganize the words 
went, slowly, he, to, always to make the sentence he always went slowly. Likewise, one could 
make the sentence the disease was chronic out of the words chronic, singing, disease, was, the. 
There were also some exercises where all words were neutral to ensure that it would not be too 
obvious that the intention was reminding the participants about disability.  The control group 
could for instance make the sentences the sun was shining and the music was exceptional. 
The study aims at investigating the social identity of PWDs without making it obvious to the 
participants. Thus, disability was not explicitly mentioned until the end of the session, when there 
were no more tasks in which the participants could be influenced by the mentioning of the word. 
Thus, a test was implemented subsequent to the lab experiment to check whether participants 
understood that these questionnaires and exercises were intended to make them think of disability. 
20 students from a school which did not participate in the lab experiment were asked to complete 
the three tasks handed out to the treatment group only. Afterward, they answered the question 
30 
 
What do you think we are trying to find out by asking you these questions? None of the answers 
indicated that the treatment was too obvious. 
6.2.1 The treatment-Control Balance 
The intention of priming randomly was to make sure that the priming was the only basic 
difference between the treatment group and the control group, but there could still be some 
differences by coincidence. Table 6-1 provides descriptive statistics for the background variables 
by treatment status. Column (1) presents averages of the treatment group, column (2) presents 
averages of the control group, and column (3) the differences between the treatment group and the 
control group. 
Table 6-1: Background variables – by treatment status 
 
 
(1) 
Priming 
(2) 
Non-priming 
(3) 
Difference 
 
Female 
 
0.467 
(0.500) 
0.563 
(0.497) 
-0.096* 
(0.051) 
 
Live with both parents 
 
0.330 
(0.471) 
0.372 
(0.485) 
-0.042 
(0.049) 
 
Age 
 
16.390 
(1.736) 
16.517 
(1.997) 
-0.127 
(0.192) 
 
TV 
 
0.654 
(0.477) 
0.653 
(0.477) 
0.001 
(0.049) 
 
Computer 
 
0.126 
(0.333) 
0.125 
(0.332) 
0.001 
(0.034) 
 
Servants 
 
0.230 
(0.422) 
0.261 
(0.440) 
-0.031 
(0.044) 
 
Government employee 
 
0.132 
(0.339) 
0.116 
(0.320) 
0.016 
(0.034) 
 
Private company employee 0.165 
(0.372) 
0.171 
(0.337) 
-0.006 
(0.038) 
 
Peasant 
 
0.159 
(0.367) 
0.191 
(0.394) 
-0.032 
(0.039) 
 
Own business 
 
0.440 
(0.498) 
0.402 
(0.492) 
0.038 
(0.051) 
 
Note: (1) and (2) present the averages of the treatment group (priming) and the control group (non-priming), 
respectively, and standard deviations in parentheses. (3) presents the differences between PWDs and non-PWDs 
and standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
There are significantly fewer females in the treatment group; the control group contains 56 
percent females, while the treatment group contains 47 percent. Thus, a dummy for females will 
be included in all regressions to control for differences that could possibly be driven by gender 
imbalances. For all other background variables, there are no differences between the treatment 
group and the control group. Thus, controlling for gender would be sufficient to make credible 
inference about the priming effect, i.e. suggestions about the social identity of PWDs. However, 
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due to the imbalances between the samples of PWDs and non-PWDs, respectively, all background 
variables mentioned in this section are controlled for when running regressions in section 8, 
namely the covariates. In that way, one can test whether the results remain the same after 
considering the possibility that the results are driven by fundamental differences between PWDs 
and non-PWDs. 
6.3 Analysis 
Extraction of information from the lab experiment is based on relevance regarding hypothesis 
testing. First, bar charts will be presented in order to give a visual understanding of the data on 
specific topics. One bar chart compares non-PWDs and PWDs, while another one compares males 
and females; both along the treatment dimension. Second, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions run in STATA provide information on whether apparent differences are statistically 
significant. 
  
32 
 
7 THE LAB EXPERIMENT 
There were 10 sessions in total, in which the same procedure was followed. The participants were 
told that the results from the session would be used in a research project on entrepreneurship 
among youths in Uganda. Precautions were made to preserve anonymity during the sessions. 
First, all participants were randomly assigned to a desk by drawing a piece of paper specifying the 
desk number. Second, desks numbers, rather than names, were reported in each activity in order 
to keep track of the payments. Third, the payment was prepared in an envelope and it was not 
possible to identify the amount of money simply by looking at it. Fourth, only the researchers 
could see the handouts after the participants filled in their answers. Participants were neither 
allowed to talk to each other nor leave the room without permission. 
Table 7-1 gives an overview of all the tasks completed in each session. The tasks and the 
variables constructed are described in detail in section 8. 
Table 7-1: The lab experiment 
Part 1 
Entrepreneurship (priming/non-priming) 
Time Choice 
Risk 
Dictator Game (altruism) 
Part 2 
Multiple Choice Questions (MCQ1) 
School and Leisure (priming/non-priming) 
Beliefs 1 and Competition Choice 
Spectator Game (fairness) 
Multiple Choice Questions (MCQ 2) 
Part 3 
Send Money? (Trust game) 
Return Money? (Trust game) 
Part 4 
Language Exercise (priming/non-priming) 
Multiple Choice Questions (MCQ 3) 
Beliefs 2 
Part 5 
Background Information 
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8 ANALYSIS 
8.1 Priming 
The answers from the handouts differentiating the treatment group and the control group are not 
of interest in itself. However, the information about whether a participant was primed or not is 
crucial. A dummy is constructed; “Priming” equals one for primed participants and zero for 
unprimed participants. This variable is used to investigate whether there are any treatment effects. 
8.2 The Covariates 
The handout Background Information requested the participants to answer some final questions. 
Some of them were general questions; name, gender, age, name of school, and mobile phone 
number. Others questions provided information about disabilities and socioeconomic background. 
The latter included questions about who they live with; the occupation of the head of household 
and whether he or she reads the newspaper; how many days per week they eat meat at home;  
whether they have a TV, computer, and servants at home, respectively. The participants had to 
answer whether they live with their father and mother; father or mother; or others, and in that case 
specify who. Regarding the head of household’s occupation they were offered five alternatives; 
private company employee, government employee, peasant, own business, and other occupations 
specified by the participants. All in all, these questions yield some information about the 
participants’ socioeconomic background, which is valuable in the sense that it is important to 
control for potential differences between PWDs and non-PWDs that are fundamental. 
“Covariates” include all background variables except for Female. 
8.3 Time Preferences 
The handout Time Choice gave the participant two options. The first option was to receive 1000 
Ush in one week or 3000 Ush in five weeks from the day of participation. Time preferences can 
be studied by generating a measure of patience. The variable “Early payment” equals one when 
the participant chose the early payment over the late payment; the higher average of “Early 
payment”, the higher average time preferences. 
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Figure 8-A 
 
Figure 8-B 
Note: Figure 8-A and 8-B present data on average time preferences; zero meaning that the late payment was chosen 
and one meaning that the early payment was chosen. Figure 8-A compares non-PWDs and PWDs, while Figure 8-B 
compares males and females. In Figure 8-A, the effect of priming on non-PWDs and PWDs, respectively, is 
perceptible by comparing the left-hand bar (control group) to the corresponding right-hand bar (treatment group). In 
Figure 8-B, potential differences between non-PWDs and PWDs in the same-gender groups are perceptible by 
comparing a left-hand bar (non-PWD) to the corresponding right-hand bar (PWD). 
 
Figure 8-A indicates that PWDs and non-PWDs have equal time preference and that the effect of 
priming on PWDs is non-existent. However, according to Figure 8-B, females seem to have lower 
time preferences than males, so there is a possibility that female PWDs are more patient than 
female non-PWDs. However, it remains to be seen whether the differences are significant. 
Table 8-1confirms that there is neither any difference between PWDs and non-PWDs, nor any 
effect of priming on PWDs. Thus, the results do not support the hypothesis that PWDs have 
higher time preferences than non-PWDs (H1). However, the female coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant; females do have a lower implicit discount rate, consistent with the 
hypothesis (H2). It means that the value of spending a certain amount today, relative to spending 
a certain higher amount in the future, is lower for females than males. Thus, males are more 
inclined to make short-sighted decisions because of higher time preferences. 
The genders are studied separately to find out whether there is any difference between PWDs and 
non-PWDs within the same-gender groups. The results are presented in Table 8-2; neither for 
females nor males is there any difference between PWDs and non-PWDs regarding time 
preferences. 
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Table 8-1: Time preferences 
 (1) (2) 
 Early payment           
No covar. 
Early payment           
With covar. 
PWD -0.029 0.008 
 (0.074) (0.076) 
PWD*Priming 0.011 0.019 
 (0.109) (0.110) 
Priming -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.062) (0.063) 
Female  -0.113** -0.119** 
 (0.052) (0.054) 
Constant 0.511*** 0.727*** 
 (0.055) (0.266) 
Sum Priming PWD -0.002 0.006 
 (0.090) (0.091) 
Observations 381 381 
Note: The table reports regressions of time preference on treatment status, controlling for disability, gender, and 
covariates. Time preference is measured by a dummy variable for choosing the early payment, i.e. having high time 
preferences. Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. Sum 
Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01. 
 
Table 8-2: Time preferences – by gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Early payment           
No covar.                       
Female 
Early payment           
With covar.                     
Female 
Early payment           
No covar.                       
Male 
Early payment           
With covar.                     
Male 
PWD -0.036 0.049 0.003 0.038 
 (0.101) (0.106) (0.109) (0.116) 
PWD*Priming -0.169 -0.199 0.064 0.070 
 (0.166) (0.170) (0.151) (0.157) 
Priming -0.048 -0.017 0.042 0.055 
 (0.081) (0.083) (0.098) (0.100) 
Constant 0.430*** 1.107*** 0.458*** 0.359 
 (0.055) (0.398) (0.073) (0.354) 
Sum Priming PWD -0.217 -0.216 0.106 0.125 
 (0.145) (0.147) (0.116) (0.118) 
Observations 197 197 184 184 
Note: The table reports regressions of time preference on treatment status, controlling for disability and covariates. 
Time preference is measured by a dummy variable for choosing the early payment, i.e. having high time preferences. 
Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. Sum Priming 
PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. (1) and (2) include females only, while (3) and (4) include males 
only. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
8.4 Trust 
In the trust game, all participants were randomly divided into pairs consisting of a Sender and a 
Receiver. Participants whose desk number was odd were assigned to the Sender role, while the 
rest was assigned to the Receiver role. The Sender received 2000 Ush and decided how much to 
send to the participant he or she was paired with; the amount ranged between 0 Ush and 2000 
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Ush. All participants were informed that this amount would be multiplied by three before it was 
sent to the Receiver, and the Receiver would later decide how much of the tripled amount to 
return to the Sender. For example, if the Sender decided to send 1000 Ush, the Receiver would 
get 3000 Ush and then decide how much of the 3000 Ush to return. Participants who sent the 
whole sum probably trusted that the Receiver would return enough to make it advantageous. 
Thus, the variable “Percentage sent to the other” measures the degree of trust. 
 
Figure 8-C 
 
Figure 8-D 
Note: Figure 8-C and 8-D present data on the average degree of trust. Trust is measured by the percentage of a 
specific amount participant I sends to participant II; an amount that is multiplied by three before II decides how 
much to return to I. Figure 8-C compares non-PWDs and PWDs, while Figure 8-D compares males and females. In 
Figure 8-C, the effect of priming on non-PWDs and PWDs, respectively, is perceptible by comparing the left-hand 
bar (control group) to the corresponding right-hand bar (treatment group). In Figure 8-D, potential differences 
between non-PWDs and PWDs in the same-gender groups are perceptible by comparing a left-hand bar (non-PWD) 
to the corresponding right-hand bar (PWD). 
 
Figure 8-C indicates that PWDs have marginally more trust than non-PWDs and that priming has 
no effect on PWDs. Figure 8-D shows a tendency of females having less trust than males. There is 
no difference between PWDs and non-PWDs among females, but male PWDs might have more 
trust than male non-PWDs. 
Table 8-3 reports no difference between PWDs and non-PWDs regarding trust and no effect of 
priming on PWDs. The results do not support the hypothesis that PWDs have less trust than non-
PWDs (H3), but the hypothesis that females have significantly less trust than males (H4) is 
supported. Thus, the inferior position of females might be central with reference to trust issues. 
However, the results do not coincide with the theory suggesting that low time preference is linked 
to trust. There is no difference between PWDs and non-PWDs within the same-gender groups; see 
Table 8-4. 
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Table 8-3: Trust 
 (1) (2) 
 Percentage sent 
to the other 
No covar. 
Percentage sent 
to the other                       
With covar. 
PWD 0.051 0.041 
 (0.051) (0.053) 
PWD*Priming 0.003 0.010 
 (0.076) (0.076) 
Priming 0.000 -0.005 
 (0.043) (0.043) 
Female -0.071** -0.081** 
 (0.036) (0.037) 
Constant 0.294*** 0.414** 
 (0.038) (0.184) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.003 0.010 
 (0.062) (0.076) 
Observations 381 381 
Note: The table reports regressions of trust on treatment status, controlling for disability, gender, and covariates. 
Trust is measured by the percentage of a specific amount a person sent to another (random) participant; an amount 
that was multiplied by three before the receiver decided how much to return to this person. Covariates include age, 
TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. Sum Priming PWD is the sum of 
PWD*Priming and Priming. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 8-4: Trust – by gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Percentage sent 
to the other                    
No covar.                       
Females 
Percentage sent 
to the other                    
With covar.                     
Females 
Percentage sent 
to the other                    
No covar.                       
Males 
Percentage sent 
to the other 
With covar.                     
Males 
PWD -0.006 -0.008 0.096 0.111 
 (0.068) (0.070) (0.078) (0.082) 
PWD*Priming 0.010 0.001 0.007 -0.031 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.108) (0.111) 
Priming 0.043 0.048 -0.050 -0.026 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.070) (0.071) 
Constant 0.218*** 0.341 0.301*** 0.383 
 (0.037) (0.263) (0.052) (0.251) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.053 0.001 -0.043 -0.031 
 (0.098) (0.112) (0.083) (0.111) 
Observations 197 197 184 184 
Note: The table reports regressions of trust on treatment status, controlling for disability and covariates. Trust is 
measured by the percentage of a specific amount a person sent to another (random) participant; an amount that was 
multiplied by three before the receiver decided how much to return to this person. Covariates include age, TV, 
computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. Sum Priming PWD is the sum of 
PWD*Priming and Priming. (1) and (2) include females only, while (3) and (4) include males only. Standard errors 
in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
8.5 Attitude to Risk 
To evaluate a person’s attitude to risk, the participants were given three cases in which they had 
to decide whether they wanted to receive a guaranteed amount of 2000 Ush or gamble with a 
specific chance of winning 4000 Ush. In the three cases, the probability of winning was 25 
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percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent, respectively. Thus, “Number of risky choices” measures the 
willingness to take risk by summing up the number of times the participant was willing to 
gamble; ranging from zero to three. If a participant was willing to gamble when the probability of 
winning was 50 percent, it certainly does not make sense if the same person was not willing to 
gamble when the probability was even higher. Such inconsistencies are defined as illogical and 
excluded from regressions specified “Subsample” to test whether it affects the results on attitude 
to risk. 
 
Figure 8-E 
 
Figure 8-F 
Note: Figure 8-E and 8-F present data on average attitude to risk, measured by the number of risky choices made in 
three cases. Each case offered two options; either receiving a specific amount guaranteed or gambling to receive the 
double amount if winning. Zero means that a person chose the safe alternative in all three cases, while three means 
that a person chose to gamble in all three cases. Figure 8-E compares non-PWDs and PWDs, while Figure 8-F 
compares males and females. In Figure 8-E, the effect of priming on non-PWDs and PWDs, respectively, is 
perceptible by comparing the left-hand bar (control group) to the corresponding right-hand bar (treatment group). In 
Figure 8-F, potential differences between non-PWDs and PWDs in the same-gender groups are perceptible by 
comparing a left-hand bar (non-PWD) to the corresponding right-hand bar (PWD). 
 
Surprisingly, Figure 8-E indicates that PWDs are more willing to take risk than non-PWDs, and 
there might be a positive effect of priming on PWDs. This seems to be the tendency among both 
males and females, although the gap between non-PWDs and PWDs is larger for females; see 
Figure 8-F. 
Table 8-5 presents the finding that PWDs are significantly more willing to take risk than non-
PWDs, contradicting the hypothesis (H5). The difference is significant regardless of whether the 
covariates are controlled for or the illogical answers excluded; se specification (2) through (4). 
There is a positive effect of priming on PWDs’ willingness to take risk. However, this effect is 
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significant only in specification (1), which means that there might be other fundamental 
differences between PWDs and non-PWDs driving the results. 
There is no difference between males and females in general. Thus, the results do not support the 
hypothesis that females are more risk averse than males (H6), but further investigation is 
necessary to find out whether there are any differences between non-PWDs and PWDs within the 
same-gender groups. 
Table 8-5: Willingness to take risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Number of risky 
choices                 
No covar. 
Full Sample 
Number of risky 
choices                 
No covar. 
Subsample 
Number of risky 
choices                 
With covar. 
Full Sample 
Number of risky 
choices                 
With covar. 
Subsample 
PWD 0.343*** 0.402*** 0.339*** 0.376** 
 (0.123) (0.141) (0.127) (0.145) 
PWD*Priming 0.143 0.148 0.117 0.120 
 (0.182) (0.212) (0.184) (0.215) 
Priming 0.123 0.139 0.118 0.133 
 (0.104) (0.120) (0.105) (0.121) 
Female -0.016 0.014 -0.029 -0.002 
 (0.087) (0.100) (0.090) (0.103) 
Constant 1.025*** 0.973*** 1.246*** 1.134** 
 (0.091) (0.105) (0.443) (0.503) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.266* 0.253 0.234 0.253 
 (0.150) (0.178) (0.151) (0.178) 
Observations 381 322 381 322 
Note: The table reports regressions of attitude to risk on treatment status, controlling for disability, gender, and 
covariates. Attitude to risk is measured by the number of risky choices made in three cases, ranging from zero to 
three. A risky choice means eliminating the option to receive a guaranteed amount and gambling on winning the 
double amount. Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. 
Full Sample includes all participants, while Subsample includes all participants whose answers are not illogical. Sum 
Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01. 
 
Specification (1) and (2) in Table 8-6 show that female PWDs are more willing to take risk than 
female non-PWD, but the difference is not statistically significant when controlling for covariates. 
The effect of priming on female PWDs is significant and positive in all regression specifications, 
indicating that the social identity of female PWDs is linked to willingness to take risk. 
Likewise, Table 8-7 presents the results for males; PWDs are significantly more willing to take 
risk than non-PWDs. The difference is significant in all specifications, but there is no effect of 
priming on male PWDs. 
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To summarize, the results on risk aversion contradicts the hypothesis that PWDs are more risk 
averse than non-PWDs (H5), which is particularly true for females as the identity of female 
PWDs might be linked to willingness to take risk. Clearly, the results do not support the 
hypothesis that females are more risk averse than males (H6). 
Table 8-6: Willingness to take risk – females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Number of risky 
choices                 
No covar. 
Full Sample 
Number of risky 
choices                 
No covar. 
Subsample 
Number of risky 
choices                 
With covar. 
Full Sample 
Number of risky 
choices                 
With covar. 
Subsample 
PWD 0.333** 0.372* 0.282 0.317 
 (0.162) (0.189) (0.171) (0.200) 
PWD*Priming 0.461* 0.558* 0.433 0.495 
 (0.268) (0.319) (0.273) (0.328) 
Priming 0.088 0.085 0.076 0.096 
 (0.130) (0.151) (0.133) (0.157) 
Constant 1.000*** 0.985*** -0.074 -0.194 
 (0.088) (0.102) (0.640) (0.746) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.549** 0.591** 0.509** 0.591** 
 (0.234) (0.286) (0.237) (0.286) 
Observations 197 165 197 165 
Note: The table reports regressions of attitude to risk on treatment status, controlling for disability and covariates. 
Attitude to risk is measured by the number of risky choices made in three cases, ranging from zero to three. A risky 
choice means eliminating the option to receive a guaranteed amount and gambling on winning the double amount. 
Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. Full Sample 
includes all females, while Subsample includes all females whose answers are not illogical. Sum Priming PWD is the 
sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 8-7: Willingness to take risk – males 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Number of risky 
choices                 
No covar. 
Full Sample 
Number of risky 
choices                 
No covar. 
Subsample 
Number of risky 
choices                 
With covar. 
Full Sample 
Number of risky 
choices                 
With covar. 
Subsample 
PWD 0.343* 0.424** 0.447** 0.512** 
 (0.189) (0.212) (0.200) (0.226) 
PWD*Priming -0.029 -0.080 -0.055 -0.088 
 (0.263) (0.301) (0.272) (0.313) 
Priming 0.158 0.197 0.145 0.177 
 (0.170) (0.193) (0.174) (0.198) 
Constant 1.042*** 0.976*** 2.048*** 1.895*** 
 (0.126) (0.144) (0.614) (0.683) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.129 0.090 0.090 0.090 
 (0.201) (0.236) (0.204) (0.236) 
Observations 184 157 184 157 
Note: The table reports regressions of attitude to risk on treatment status, controlling for disability and covariates. 
Attitude to risk is measured by the number of risky choices made in three cases, ranging from zero to three. A risky 
choice means eliminating the option to receive a guaranteed amount and gambling on winning the double amount. 
Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. Full Sample 
includes all males, while Subsample includes all males whose answers are not illogical. Sum Priming PWD is the 
sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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8.6 Willingness to Compete 
The participants were given two options; either working for the same fixed rate in the second 
round of Multiple Choice Questions (MCQ2) or choose to compete. Entering into a competition 
implied that payments were contingent on the relative performance; those who performed better 
than the average in MCQ1 received the fixed rate of 500 Ush per correct answer in MCQ2. 
However, those who performed worse than this average received nothing regardless of correct 
answers. “Competition” is equal to one if a person chose to compete, while equal to zero if a 
person chose the fixed rate. 
 
Figure 8-G 
 
Figure 8-H 
Note: Figure 8-G and 8-H present data on average willingness to compete, measured by a dummy variable for 
competition choice. Zero means no competition and one means competition, i.e. payment for each correct answer is 
contingent on above-average performance. Figure 8-G compares non-PWDs and PWDs, while Figure 8-H compares 
males and females. In Figure 8-G, the effect of priming on non-PWDs and PWDs, respectively, is perceptible by 
comparing the left-hand bar (control group) to the corresponding right-hand bar (treatment group). In Figure 8-H, 
potential differences between non-PWDs and PWDs in the same-gender groups are perceptible by comparing a left-
hand bar (non-PWD) to the corresponding right-hand bar (PWD). 
 
Figure 8-G indicates that non-PWDs and PWDs are equally willing to compete. Figure 8-H gives 
the impression that males are somewhat more willing to compete, but the bar charts are not 
sufficient to evaluate significance. 
Table 8-8 shows that there is no difference between PWDs and non-PWDs when it comes to 
willingness to compete. There is no significant difference between males and females in neither of 
the same-gender groups; see Table 8-9. Priming has no effect on PWDs, neither in the full sample 
nor in the same-gender groups. Thus, the results do not support the hypotheses that PWDs are less 
willing than non-PWDs to compete (H7) and that females are less willing than males to compete 
(H8).  
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Table 8-8: Willingness to compete 
 (1) (2) 
 Compete                 
No covar. 
Compete                 
With covar. 
PWD 0.034 0.017 
 (0.072) (0.075) 
PWD*Priming -0.039 -0.044 
 (0.107) (0.108) 
Priming 0.032 0.034 
 (0.061) (0.062) 
Female -0.053 -0.034 
 (0.051) (0.053) 
Constant 0.379*** 0.214 
 (0.053) (0.261) 
Sum Priming PWD -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.088) (0.089) 
Observations 381 381 
Note: The table reports regressions of willingness to compete on treatment status, controlling for disability, gender, 
and covariates. Willingness to compete is measured by a dummy variable equaling one if a person chose to compete, 
i.e. payment for each correct answer is contingent on above-average performance (the competition rate was higher 
than the fixed rate). Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of 
household. Sum Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 8-9: Willingness to compete – by gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Compete                 
No covar.                       
Female 
Compete                 
With covar.                     
Female 
Compete                 
No covar.                       
Male 
Compete                 
With covar.                     
Male 
PWD 0.090 0.066 -0.032 -0.010 
 (0.099) (0.106) (0.107) (0.114) 
PWD*Priming -0.178 -0.168 0.081 0.035 
 (0.163) (0.169) (0.149) (0.154) 
Priming 0.079 0.084 -0.033 -0.012 
 (0.079) (0.083) (0.096) (0.099) 
Constant 0.304*** 0.050 0.417*** 0.319 
 (0.054) (0.397) (0.071) (0.349) 
Sum Priming PWD -0.100 -0.085 0.048 0.023 
 (0.143) (0.147) (0.114) (0.116) 
Observations 197 197 184 184 
Note: The table reports regressions of willingness to compete on treatment status, controlling for disability and 
covariates. Willingness to compete is measured by a dummy variable equaling one if a person chose to compete, i.e. 
payment for each correct answer is contingent on above-average performance (the competition rate was higher than 
the fixed rate). Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of household head. Sum 
Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. (1) and (2) include females only, while (3) and (4) include 
males only. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
8.7 Altruism 
The dictator game was organized as follows; all participants were told that they had been 
randomly paired with another participant and that the task would be completed under anonymity. 
Given that participant A was paired with B, B was not paired with A.  Participant A was told that 
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they together received 2000 Ush and that he or she was the one to decide how to distribute the 
money between the two of them. The variable “Percentage given” works as a measure of altruism; 
the higher percentage a participant gives to the other participant, the more altruistic. 
 
Figure 8-I 
 
Figure 8-J 
Note: Figure 8-I and 8-J present data on the average degree of altruism; measured by the percentage of a specific 
amount that a person decided to give to another (random) participant. Figure 8-I compares non-PWDs and PWDs, 
while Figure 8-J compares males and females. In Figure 8-I, the effect of priming on non-PWDs and PWDs, 
respectively, is perceptible by comparing the left-hand bar (control group) to the corresponding right-hand bar 
(treatment group). In Figure 8-J, potential differences between non-PWDs and PWDs in the same-gender groups are 
perceptible by comparing a left-hand bar (non-PWD) to the corresponding right-hand bar (PWD) 
 
Figure 8-I and Figure 8-J do not show any remarkable differences, neither between PWDs and 
non-PWDs nor between males and females. Priming might cause PWDs to become slightly more 
altruistic, but the treatment effect is probably not significant; see Table 8-I. 
Table 8-10 reports no difference regarding how altruistic PWDs are compared to non-PWDs. 
Neither is there any difference between females and males. The effect of priming is not 
significant; the identity of PWDs cannot be linked to altruism. Thus, the results do not support the 
hypotheses that PWDs are more altruistic than non-PWDs (H9) and that females are more 
altruistic than males (H10). These results do not differ from findings in the same-gender groups; 
see Table 8-11. 
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Table 8-10: Altruism 
 (1) (2) 
 Percentage 
given 
No covar. 
Percentage 
given 
With covar. 
PWD -0.006 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.031) 
PWD*Priming 0.047 0.048 
 (0.045) (0.045) 
Priming -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
Female -0.019 -0.024 
 (0.021) (0.022) 
Constant 0.424*** 0.444*** 
 (0.023) (0.108) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.035 0.048 
 (0.037) (0.045) 
Observations 381 381 
Note: The table reports regressions of altruism on treatment status, controlling for disability, gender, and covariates. 
Altruism is measured by the percentage of a specific amount that a person decided to give to another (random) 
participant. Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. Sum 
Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01. 
 
Table 8-11: Altruism – by gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Percentage 
given 
 No covar.                       
Female 
Percentage given 
With covar.                     
Female 
Percentage 
Given 
No covar.                       
Male 
Percentage 
Given 
With covar.                     
Male 
PWD 0.024 0.001 -0.035 -0.020 
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) 
PWD*Priming -0.031 -0.001 0.101* 0.083 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.060) (0.062) 
Priming -0.002 -0.008 -0.025 -0.019 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) 
Constant 0.400*** 0.378** 0.432*** 0.472*** 
 (0.024) (0.169) (0.029) (0.139) 
Sum Priming PWD -0.033 -0.001 0.076 0.083 
 (0.063) (0.072) (0.046) (0.062) 
Observations 197 197 184 184 
Note: The table reports regressions of altruism on treatment status, controlling for disability and covariates. Altruism 
is measured by the percentage of a specific amount that a person decided to give to another (random) participant. 
Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. Sum Priming 
PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. (1) and (2) include females only, while (3) and (4) include males 
only. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
8.8 Fairness 
In the Spectator Game, all participants were told that they were going to act like a judge. The 
situation was as follows; one participant performed better than average in MCQ1 and therefore 
earned an additional reward of 1500 Ush, while another participant performed worse than the 
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average and earned an additional reward of 500 Ush. Together these participants earned a total 
reward of 2000 Ush and the third participant was the one to decide how to distribute the total 
reward. The first option was splitting the reward equally and the second option was giving each 
participant exactly the amount earned. It is assumed that the participants made their choice based 
on what they perceived as fair. A dummy variable is constructed, equaling one if the total reward 
was split equally and zero if it was split according to their performance. Thus, “Split equally” 
allows comparison of the fairness views of various groups; the closer the average is to one, the 
closer the average person is to the view that all inequalities are unfair regardless of individual 
achievements. 
 
Figure 8-K 
 
Figure 8-L 
Note: Figure 8-K and 8-L present data on the average fairness view, measured by a dummy variable; equal to one if 
all inequalities are viewed as unfair regardless of individual performance, and equal to zero  if inequalities are 
viewed as fair due to inequalities in individual performance. Figure 8-K compares non-PWDs and PWDs, while 
Figure 8-L compares males and females. In Figure 8-K, the effect of priming on non-PWDs and PWDs, respectively, 
is perceptible by comparing the left-hand bar (control group) to the corresponding right-hand bar (treatment group). 
In Figure 8-L, potential differences between non-PWDs and PWDs in the same-gender groups are perceptible by 
comparing a left-hand bar (non-PWD) to the corresponding right-hand bar (PWD). 
 
Figure 8-K indicates that PWDs and non-PWDs in the control group share fairness views, while 
there might be a difference in the treatment group. Both PWDs and non-PWDs are closest to the 
view that inequalities are fair if they result from inequalities in individual performance. However, 
priming seems to make non-PWDs accept more inequality and PWDs accept less inequality. 
Among non-PWDs, there is a tendency of females wanting to split equally more often than males; 
the opposite of the tendency among PWDs; see Figure 8-L. However, among males, it seems like 
PWDs want to split equally more often than non-PWDs, while there seems to be no difference 
among females. 
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There is no difference between PWDs and non-PWDs neither in the full sample, nor in the same-
gender groups; see Table 8-12 and Table 8-13. Thus, the hypothesis that PWDs are more inclined 
to view all inequalities as unfair, regardless of individual achievements (H11), is not supported. 
However, the results support the hypothesis that females and males share fairness views (H12). 
Table 8-12: Fairness view 
 (1) (2) 
 Split equally 
No covar. 
Split equally                               
With covar. 
PWD 0.005 0.005 
 (0.066) (0.069) 
PWD*Priming 0.123 0.104 
 (0.098) (0.099) 
Priming -0.078 -0.074 
 (0.056) (0.056) 
Female 0.026 0.020 
 (0.047) (0.048) 
Constant 0.275*** 0.293 
 (0.049) (0.239) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.045 0.104 
 (0.080) (0.099) 
Observations 381 381 
Note: The table reports regressions of fairness view on treatment status, controlling for disability, gender, and 
covariates. Fairness view is measured by a dummy variable referring to how a total reward (earned by two 
participants based on individual performance) was distributed by a third person; equal to one if the reward was split 
equally regardless of individual performance and zero if the reward was split according to the reward earned. 
Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. Sum Priming 
PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 8-13: Fairness view – by gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Split equally                       
No covar.                               
Female 
Split equally                       
With covar.                             
Female 
Split equally                       
No covar.                               
Male 
Split equally                       
With covar.                             
Male 
PWD -0.018 -0.027 0.016 -0.022 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.095) (0.102) 
PWD*Priming 0.121 0.142 0.142 0.131 
 (0.154) (0.156) (0.132) (0.138) 
Priming -0.041 -0.056 -0.125 -0.126 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.085) (0.089) 
Constant 0.291*** 0.955*** 0.292*** -0.168 
 (0.051) (0.366) (0.063) (0.313) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.080 0.142 0.017 0.131 
 (0.135) (0.156) (0.101) (0.138) 
Observations 197 197 184 184 
Note: The table reports regressions of fairness view on treatment status, controlling for disability and covariates. 
Fairness view is measured by a dummy variable referring to how a total reward (earned by two participants based on 
individual performance) was distributed by a third person; equal to one if the reward was split equally regardless of 
individual performance and zero if the reward was split according to the reward earned. Covariates include age, TV, 
computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. (1) and (2) include females only, while (3) and 
(4) include males only. Sum Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. Standard errors in parentheses; 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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8.9 Performance 
8.9.1 Performance under Fixed Rate 
The first set of Multiple Choice Questions (MCQ1) contained math exercises and general 
knowledge questions where the topics were geography, science, health and nutrition, and sports. 
The participants were paid a fixed rate of 200 Ush for each correct answer. The variable 
“Performance (fixed rate)” measures the number of correct answers out of the 10 questions in 
MCQ1. In addition to providing a measure of performance, it is valuable because it is important 
to compare beliefs about own performance to actual performance. 
The score distribution of MCQ1 is close to a normal distribution, with a mean of 6.4 correct 
answers; see Figure 8-M. For each question, there were four possible answers to tick off. Thus, if 
the participants had no clue, they would, on average, get 2.5 correct answers by guessing their 
way through the questions. Only 9 out of 381participants scored less than 2.5 correct answers. In 
MCQ1, the single question most participants failed to answer correctly was the average heart beat 
per minute for a resting adult male. The possible answers were 100, 40, 150, and 70, but only 47 
percent answered 70, which is the correct answer. Regarding the remaining nine questions, 
respectively, no less than 52 percent of the participants provided the correct answer.  
 
Figure 8-M 
 
Note: The figure presents the score distribution of the Multiple Choice Questions under fixed rate, i.e. no 
competition. Score is measured by the number of correct answers out of 10. The horizontal axis measures the score, 
whereas the vertical axis measures the density. 
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Figure 8-N 
 
Figure 8-O 
Note: Figure 8-N and 8-O present data on average performance in the first round of Multiple Choice Questions 
(fixed rate). Performance is measured by the number of correct answers out of 10. Figure 8-N compares non-PWDs 
and PWDs, while Figure 8-O compares males and females. In Figure 8-N, the effect of priming on non-PWDs and 
PWDs, respectively, is perceptible by comparing the left-hand bar (control group) to the corresponding right-hand 
bar (treatment group). In Figure 8-O, potential differences between non-PWDs and PWDs in the same-gender 
groups are perceptible by comparing a left-hand bar (non-PWD) to the corresponding right-hand bar (PWD). 
 
Figure 8-N indicates that PWDs perform as well as non-PWDs, also within the same-gender 
groups; see Figure 8-O. However, females tend to perform slightly worse than males. 
There is no difference between PWDs and non-PWDs, but females perform significantly worse 
than males; see Table 8-14. Priming has no impact on the performance of PWDs under fixed rate. 
Thus, the results do not support the stereotype threat hypothesis (H13). However, the hypothesis 
that females perform worse than males (H14) is supported by evidence. 
In Table 8-15, specification (1) and (2) present the results for females. The results suggest that 
female PWDs perform somewhat better than female non-PWDs, but the difference is significant 
only when controlling for covariates, indicating that other fundamental differences might be 
driving these results. Thus, the inferior performance of females is to a greater extent driven by the 
poor performance of non-PWDs than PWDs. There is no difference between PWDs and non-
PWDs among males; see specification (3) and (4). 
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Table 8-14: Performance fixed rate 
 (1) (2) 
 Performance     
(fixed rate)              
No covar. 
Performance 
(fixed rate)          
With covar. 
PWD 0.255 0.257 
 (0.275) (0.282) 
PWD*Priming -0.363 -0.418 
 (0.406) (0.407) 
Priming 0.097 0.109 
 (0.232) (0.232) 
Female -0.720*** -0.698*** 
 (0.194) (0.198) 
Constant 6.645*** 4.790*** 
 (0.204) (0.981) 
Sum Priming PWD -0.265 -0.309 
 (0.334) (0.335) 
Observations 381 381 
Note: The table reports regressions of performance under fixed rate on treatment status, controlling for disability, 
gender, and covariates. Performance is measured by the number of correct answers out of 10 in the first round of 
Multiple Choice Questions. Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of 
household. Sum Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 8-15: Performance fixed rate – by gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Performance     
(fixed rate)              
No covar.                       
Females 
Performance 
(fixed rate)          
With covar.                     
Females 
Performance     
(fixed rate)              
No covar.                       
Males 
Performance 
(fixed rate)          
With covar.                     
Males 
PWD 0.523 0.655* -0.064 0.175 
 (0.374) (0.387) (0.411) (0.431) 
PWD*Priming -0.582 -0.710 -0.041 -0.456 
 (0.616) (0.617) (0.572) (0.584) 
Priming 0.249 0.290 -0.133 0.068 
 (0.299) (0.301) (0.369) (0.374) 
Constant 5.810*** 1.617 6.833*** 6.857*** 
 (0.203) (1.446) (0.275) (1.320) 
Sum Priming PWD -0.333 -0.420 -0.175 -0.389 
 (0.539) (0.535) (0.437) (0.439) 
Observations 197 197 184 184 
Note: The table reports regressions of performance under fixed rate on treatment status, controlling for disability and 
covariates. Performance is measured by the number of correct answers out of 10 in the first round of Multiple Choice 
Questions. Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of household. Sum 
Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. (1) and (2) include females only, while (3) and (4) include 
males only. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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8.9.2 Performance under Competition 
Like MCQ1, MCQ2 and MCQ3 included general knowledge questions and math exercises. 
However, in MCQ2 the participants chose either to work for a fixed rate or to compete. Thus, the 
same rules did not apply to all participants in this round, so a performance measure from MCQ2 
will not be object of analysis. Nevertheless, MCQ2 was important in order to measure the 
willingness to compete; see section 8.6. In MCQ3, all participants had to compete, implicating 
that they were paid per correct answer only if they performed better than the average in MCQ1. 
The variable “Performance (competition)” measures the number of correct answers out of the 10 
questions in MCQ3. This performance measure, as well, is used to check whether the beliefs 
about performance were realistic. 
Figure 8-P presents the score distribution of MCQ3, with a mean of 6.4 correct answers; 
equivalent to the mean under fixed rate. In MCQ3, the single question most participants failed to 
answer correctly was the length of a normal pregnancy for women. The alternatives were 25, 40, 
30, and 50 weeks, but only 41 percent answered 40 weeks, which is the correct answer. A 
question regarding the human body’s most important source of energy apparently was the second 
hardest question; 49 percent managed to provide the correct answer, i.e. carbohydrates. Regarding 
the remaining eight questions, respectively, no less than 51 percent of the participants provided 
the correct answer. 
 
Figure 8-P 
 
Note: The score distribution of the Multiple Choice Questions under competition. Score is measured by the number of 
correct answers out of 10. The horizontal axis measures the score, whereas the vertical axis measures the density. 
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Figure 8-Q 
 
Figure 8-R 
Note: Figure 8-Q and 8-R present data on average performance in the third round of Multiple Choice Questions 
(competition rate). Performance is measured by the number of correct answers out of 10. Figure 8-Q compares non-
PWDs and PWDs, while Figure 8-R compares males and females. In Figure 8-Q, the effect of priming on non-PWDs 
and PWDs, respectively, is perceptible by comparing the left-hand bar (control group) to the corresponding right-
hand bar (treatment group). In Figure 8-R, potential differences between non-PWDs and PWDs in the same-gender 
groups are perceptible by comparing a left-hand bar (non-PWD) to the corresponding right-hand bar (PWD). 
 
Figure 8-Q indicates that PWDs perform somewhat better under competition than non-PWDs and 
that there is no effect of priming on the performance of PWDs. Females tend to be inferior 
performers; see Figure 8-R. However, the significance of these differences is tested below. 
Table 8-16: Performance competition rate  
 (1) (2) 
 Performance     
competition             
No covar. 
Performance 
competition         
With covar. 
PWD 0.555**  0.482* 
 (0.267) (0.277) 
PWD*Priming 0.262 0.174 
 (0.395) (0.400) 
Priming -0.016 -0.004 
 (0.226) (0.227) 
Female -0.773*** -0.714*** 
 (0.188) (0.195) 
Constant 6.591*** 4.831*** 
 (0.198) (0.963) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.246 0.170 
 (0.325) (0.329) 
Observations 381 381 
Note: The table reports regressions of performance under competition on treatment status, controlling for disability, 
gender, and covariates. Performance is measured by the number of correct answers out of 10 in the first round of 
Multiple Choice Questions. Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of 
household. Sum Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 8-16 shows that the performance of PWDs under competition is better than the performance 
of non-PWDs. Females perform worse under competition as well, which is natural as competition 
puts even more pressure on the performers. 
Table 8-17: Performance competition rate – by gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Performance     
competition             
No covar.                       
Females 
Performance 
competition         
With covar.                     
Females 
Performance     
competition             
No covar.                       
Males 
Performance 
competition         
With covar.                     
Males 
PWD 0.908** 0.935** 0.088 0.187 
 (0.372) (0.397) (0.388) (0.415) 
PWD*Priming -0.231 -0.358 0.907* 0.577 
 (0.612) (0.634) (0.540) (0.563) 
Priming 0.363 0.424 -0.554 -0.377 
 (0.297) (0.309) (0.348) (0.360) 
Constant 5.608*** 3.374** 6.937*** 5.442*** 
 (0.202) (1.484) (0.260) (1.272) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.132 0.066 0.353 0.200 
 (0.535) (0.549) (0.413) (0.423) 
Observations 197 197 184 184 
Note: The table reports regressions of performance under competition on treatment status, controlling for disability 
and covariates. Performance is measured by the number of correct answers out of the ten in the first round of 
Multiple Choice Questions. Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, and occupation of head of 
household. Sum Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. (1) and (2) include females only, while (3) 
and (4) include males only. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Potential differences between PWDs and non-PWDs within the same-gender groups are presented 
in Table 8-17. Female PWDs perform better than female non-PWDs under competition as well, 
and the difference is now significant regardless of whether one controls for covariates; see 
specification (1) and (2). Among males, there is no difference between PWDs and non-PWDs. 
There is no effect of priming in neither of the same-gender groups. 
8.10 Self-Confidence 
The first handout about beliefs provided the questions used to construct the variables measuring 
confidence. The participants were first asked how many questions they thought they answered 
correctly, out of the 10 questions in MCQ1. The variable B1, i.e. beliefs about own performance 
under fixed rate, measures the number of answers the participant thought he or she got right. 
Secondly, they were asked how many questions they thought, on average, that the others 
answered correctly; the variable B2, i.e. beliefs about others performance. 
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Figure 8-S indicates no remarkable differences between PWDs and non-PWDs concerning beliefs 
about own performance. Figure 8-T points to females believing that they perform worse than 
males, which would be consistent with the fact that their performance truly is inferior. 
 
Figure 8-S 
 
Figure 8-T 
Note: Figure 8-S and 8-T present data on average beliefs about own performance under fixed rate. Performance is 
measured by the number of correct answers a person thinks he or she was able to provide. Figure 8-S compares non-
PWDs and PWDs, while Figure 8-T compares males and female. In Figure 8-S, the effect of priming on non-PWDs 
and PWDs, respectively, is perceptible by comparing the left-hand bar (control group) to the corresponding right-
hand bar (treatment group). In Figure 8-T, potential differences between non-PWDs and PWDs in the same-gender 
groups are perceptible by comparing a left-hand bar (non-PWD) to the corresponding right-hand bar (PWD). 
 
Table 8-18: Beliefs about own performance (fixed rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Beliefs own 
performance 
(fixed rate)                    
No covar. 
Full Sample 
Beliefs own 
performance 
(fixed rate) 
With covar. 
Full Sample 
Beliefs own 
performance 
(fixed rate)                    
With covar.             
Subsample 
PWD 0.195 0.240 0.357 
 (0.244) (0.254) (0.246) 
PWD* Priming -0.151 -0.183 -0.303 
 (0.361) (0.366) (0.354) 
Priming 0.028 0.044 0.041 
 (0.206) (0.208) (0.201) 
Female -0.759*** -0.777*** -0.829*** 
 (0.172) (0.178) (0.172) 
Constant 8.000*** 7.330*** 7.332*** 
 (0.181) (0.881) (0.851) 
Sum Priming PWD -0.123 -0.139 -0.262 
 (0.297) (0.301) (0.292) 
Observations 381 381 380 
Note: The table reports regressions of belief about own performance on treatment status, controlling for disability, 
gender, and covariates. Belief is measured by how many correct answers a person thinks he or she was able to 
provide in the first round of Multiple Choice Questions. Covariates include age, TV, computer, newspaper, servants, 
and occupation of head of household. Sum Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming. Full Sample 
includes all participants, while Subsample includes all participants whose answers are not equal to zero. Standard 
errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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There is no difference between PWDs and non-PWDs, i.e. both groups are too optimistic about 
their own performance; see Table 8-18. Females believe that they perform significantly worse 
than males, which is consistent with the fact that females are inferior performers. However, it is 
more interesting to study beliefs about own performance relative to beliefs about other’s 
performance, i.e. a measure of confidence. A new variable called “Confidence” is constructed by 
subtracting B2 from B1, i.e. beliefs about others’ performance is subtracted from beliefs about 
own performance. Thus, a negative gap might imply low self-confidence as a negative number 
means that one thinks one’s own performance is inferior to other’s performance.  
 
Figure 8-U 
 
Figure 8-V 
Note: Figure 8-U and 8-V present data on the average degree of confidence. Confidence is measured by beliefs about 
own performance minus beliefs about others’ performance in the first round of Multiple Choice Questions (fixed 
rate).  Figure 8-U compares non-PWDs and PWDs, while Figure 8-V compares males and females. In Figure 8-U, 
the effect of priming on non-PWDs and PWDs, respectively, is perceptible by comparing the left-hand bar (control 
group) to the corresponding right-hand bar (treatment group). In Figure 8-V, potential differences between non-
PWDs and PWDs in the same-gender groups are perceptible by comparing a left-hand bar (non-PWD) to the 
corresponding right-hand bar (PWD). 
 
Figure 8-U indicates that non-PWDs in the both the treatment group and the control group are 
confident. PWDs in the control group tend to be realistic, based on the fact that PWDs and non-
PWD perform equally well, whereas PWDs in the treatment group seem to be confident. This 
implies a positive priming effect, which is rather surprising. According to Figure 8-V females 
tend to be less confident than males. Female PWDs seem to believe that they are inferior 
performers, which is consistent with facts, whereas female non-PWDs seem to be overconfident. 
Males tend to be confident regardless of disability status. 
The results on confidence are presented in Table 8-19. Although PWDs are less confident than 
non-PWDs, the confidence gap is positive for both groups despite the fact that the two groups 
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perform equally well; see specification (1) and (2). Females are generally less confident than 
males, but the gap is positive for female non-PWDs; thus, they are overconfident because the gap 
would have been negative if their beliefs were realistic. Female PWDs constitute the only group 
whose confidence gap is negative. There is a positive effect of priming on PWDs, but this effect is 
not significant when excluding participants whose answers equal zero. Specification (3) and (4) 
show that the effect of priming on PWDs is positive and highly significant in the female sample, 
while there is no effect in the male sample. 
Table 8-19: Confidence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Confidence                       
Full Sample 
Confidence 
Subsample 
Confidence                                                
Subsample 
Female 
Confidence                                       
Subsample 
Male 
PWD -0.977*** -0.840*** -1.204*** -0.492 
 (0.322) (0.314) (0.431) (0.463) 
PWD* Priming 0.511 0.363 1.160 -0.184 
 (0.476) (0.463) (0.710) (0.643) 
Priming 0.139 0.134 0.092 0.204 
 (0.273) (0.265) (0.344) (0.413) 
Female -0.629*** -0.682***   
 (0.227) (0.221)   
Constant 1.265*** 1.298*** 0.658*** 1.229*** 
 (0.239) (0.232) (0.234) (0.308) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.650* 0.498 1.251** 0.020 
 (0.392) (0.382) (0.621) (0.493) 
Observations 381 380 197 183 
Note: The table reports regressions of confidence on treatment status, controlling for disability and gender. 
Confidence is measured by beliefs about own performance minus beliefs about other's performance in the third round 
of Multiple Choice Questions. Sum Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and Priming.  Full Sample includes all 
participants, while Subsample includes all participants whose answers are not equal to zero; (1) includes all 
participants, (2) includes all participants whose answers are not equal to zero, (3) includes all females whose 
answers are not equal to zero, (4) includes all males whose answers are not equal to zero. Standard errors in 
parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
However, it remains to examine the extent to which the confidence gap is driven by inequalities in 
performance. For instance, if the positive confidence gap for males simply reflects that males are 
aware that they are superior performers, then they are not overconfident but simply realistic. 
Likewise, the negative confidence gap for female PWDs can occur without underconfidence since 
their performance truly is inferior; in that case it would be a sign of realism rather than 
underconfidence. Thus, a variable called “Relative Confidence” is generated. This variable is 
constructed by subtracting the gap between own (P1) and average (P2) actual performance from 
the Confidence measure. Hence, Confidence (C) is measured by 
       , 
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while Relative Confidence (RC) is measured by 
               ). 
If RC > 0, it implies that one underestimates others and/or overestimates oneself. In any case, one 
can be said to be overconfident. Similarly, RC < 0 implies that one overestimates others and/or 
underestimates oneself and one can thus be said to be underconfident. 
Table 8-20: Confidence relative to actual performance (RC) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Relative 
Confidence                      
Relative 
Confidence                     
Subsample 
Relative 
Confidence                      
Female 
Relative 
Confidence  
Male 
Relative 
Confidence  
Male    
Subsample                 
PWD -1.232*** -1.147*** -1.727*** -0.704 -0.527 
 (0.383) (0.381) (0.526) (0.565) (0.560) 
PWD* Priming 0.874 0.782 1.742** 0.132 -0.044 
 (0.565) (0.562) (0.866) (0.788) (0.778) 
Priming 0.042 0.039 -0.157 0.337 0.337 
 (0.324) (0.321) (0.420) (0.508) (0.500) 
Female 0.091 0.058    
 (0.270) (0.268)    
Constant 0.972*** 0.993*** 1.200*** 0.748** 0.748** 
 (0.284) (0.282) (0.285) (0.379) (0.373) 
Sum Priming PWD 0.916** 0.821* 1.585** 0.470 0.294 
 (0.465) (0.464) (0.757) (0.602) (0.596) 
Observations 381 380 197 184 183 
Note: The table reports regressions of Relative Confidence on treatment status, controlling for disability and gender. 
Relative Confidence is a measure of Confidence adjusted by actual performance. Confidence is measured by beliefs 
about own performance minus beliefs about other’s performance. The gap between own and average actual 
performance is subtracted from Confidence, thereby constructing the variable Relative Confidence. Thus, Relative 
confidence is a measure of overconfidence or underconfidence. Sum Priming PWD is the sum of PWD*Priming and 
Priming. (1) includes all participants, (2) includes all participants whose answers are not equal to zero, (3) includes 
all females (there are no females to exclude as no females answered zero), (4) includes all males, and (5) includes all 
males whose answers are not equal to zero. Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
The results on Relative Confidence are presented in Table 8-20. The confidence of female PWDs 
increases by 3.5 percent when actual performance is taken into account; compare specification (3) 
in Table 8-20 and 8-19. Such a small increase indicates that realistic notions are not the major 
contributor to low self-confidence. Female PWDs’ low level of confidence mainly stems from 
underestimation of their own performance and/or overestimation of others’ performance. Thus, 
the results suggest that underconfidence is a problem among female PWDs. 
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For female non-PWDs, the variable Relative Confidence is 82 percent higher than Confidence; 
they reveal an even higher level of confidence when actual performance is taken into account. It 
gives further support to the finding that female non-PWDs are overconfident. 
Among males, there is still no difference between PWDs and non-PWDs. The gap is reduced by 
39 percent when actual performance is taken into account; indicating that a relatively big part of 
the positive gap was due to realistic notions about males’ superior performance. However, the 
major contributor to confidence of males is overestimation of their own performance and/or 
underestimation of others; males are overconfident. 
The effect of priming on females is positive, while there is no effect on males; equivalent to the 
results on Confidence in Table 8-19. It makes sense that priming has greater impact on those who 
are underconfident compared to the overconfident. However, Relative Confidence reveals a 
significant priming effect on PWDs in the full sample as well; see specification (1) and (2) in 
Table 8-20. 
To summarize, the results support the hypothesis that PWDs are less confident than non-PWDs 
and generally underconfident (H15), but contradict the hypothesis that there is a negative effect of 
priming on the confidences of PWDs (H16). The hypothesis that females generally are less 
confident than males (H17) is not supported. 
8.11 Prejudices and Inferiority 
The variable measuring prejudice is based on information from the second handout about beliefs, 
i.e. beliefs about the performance in MCQ3. The participants were first asked how many 
questions they thought, on average, that the PWDs answered correctly. Second, they were asked 
how many questions they thought that the non-PWDs answered correctly. Importantly, these 
questions, which explicitly mention disabilities, were the last questions before the background 
information in order to avoid unintended priming. The variable constructed “Beliefs about non-
PWDs minus PWDs”, which reports a number different from zero whenever someone believes 
that there is an ability gap between PWDs and non-PWDs. If non-PWDs believe that there is a 
positive ability gap, in favor of non-PWDs, it suggests that non-PWDs have prejudices; given that 
the two groups perform equally well. Likewise, if PWDs believe that the gap is positive, it 
suggests that PWDs have beliefs of inferiority. Inferiority implies that PWDs have internalized 
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the social norms causing prejudices against PWDs. Importantly; prejudices are present regardless 
of which group a person belongs to. Thus, this measure does not include beliefs about own 
performance, rather general beliefs about PWDs and non-PWDs. The participants were not asked 
explicitly whether they have prejudices against PWDs or consider PWDs as inferior. However, 
they implicitly answer that question through expressing their beliefs about the performance of 
PWDs and non-PWDs; thus, the “Beliefs about non-PWDs minus PWDs” works as an implicit 
measure of prejudice, given that PWDs are not truly inferior performers. 
 
Figure 8-W 
 
Note: The figure presents data on the average degree of prejudice against PWDs. Prejudice is measured by beliefs 
about the performance of non-PWDs minus beliefs about the performance of PWDs (in the third round of Multiple 
Choice Questions, i.e. competition rate). The figure compares non-PWDs and PWDs. The effect of priming on non-
PWDs and PWDs, respectively, is perceptible by comparing the left-hand bar (control group) to the corresponding 
right-hand bar (treatment group). 
 
Since PWDs perform at least as well as non-PWDs, a positive ability gap is an implicit measure 
of prejudice as it reveals the belief that PWDs are inferior performers. The four positive gaps in 
Figure 8-W indicate that all participants, regardless of disability status, believe that PWDs 
perform worse than non-PWDs. Thus, it suggests that non-PWDs, regardless of treatment, have 
prejudices against PWDs. PWDs seem to have beliefs of inferiority about their own group, but the 
average ability gap tend to be smaller among primed PWDs than unprimed PWDs; priming does 
not eliminate the beliefs of inferiority, but it might induce PWDs to think of their own group as 
less inferior. However, it remains to investigate whether the priming effect is significant.  
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Table 8-21 shows that there is no difference between PWDs and non-PWDs regarding the 
inferiority of PWDs and no effect of priming. Thus, the constant term showing the average belief 
of male non-PWDs is applicable to all participants regardless of treatment status and disability 
status. Thus, the significant constant term in specification (1) implies that non-PWDs do have 
prejudices against PWDs, and that the social norms of PWDs’ inferiority are internalized by 
PWDs. These results are unchanged when controlling for covariates and there is no effect of 
priming on PWDs’ beliefs of inferiority. The results support the hypothesis that non-PWDs have 
prejudices against PWDs (H18). 
Table 8-21: Prejudices and inferiority 
 (1) (2) 
 Beliefs about 
non-PWDs 
minus PWDs               
Full Sample 
Beliefs about 
non-PWDs 
minus PWDs               
Subsample 
PWD 0.116 0.130 
 (0.346) (0.323) 
PWD* Priming -0.580 -0.434 
W (0.511) (0.478) 
Priming 0.004 -0.022 
 (0.293) (0.272) 
Female 0.272 0.106 
 (0.244) (0.227) 
Constant 0.524** 0.638*** 
 (0.257) (0.239) 
Sum Priming PWD -0.577 -0.456 
 (0.421) (0.395) 
Observations 381 376 
Note: The table reports regressions of prejudice on treatment status, controlling for disability and gender. Prejudice 
is measured by beliefs about the performance of non-PWDs minus beliefs about the performance of PWDs. 
Performance is measured by the number of questions a person thinks that non-PWDs (PWDs) were able to provide in 
the third round of Multiple Choice Questions, i.e. under competition. Prejudice against one’s own group is rather 
called inferiority; a result of internalizing the norms causing prejudice. Sum Priming PWD is the sum of 
PWD*Priming and Priming. (1) includes all participants, whereas (2) includes all participants whose answers do not 
equal zero. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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8.12 Summary of Results 
Table 8-22 summarizes the hypotheses tested and whether or not they are supported by the results 
from the analysis in this section. 
Table 8-22: Summary of hypothesis tests 
Hypothesis Results 
H1 PWDs are less patient than non-PWDs Not supported 
H2 Females are more patient than males Supported 
H3 PWDs have less trust than non-PWDs Not supported 
H4 Females have less trust than males Supported 
H5 PWDs are more risk averse than non-PWDs Contradicted 
H6 Females are more risk averse than males Not supported 
H7 PWDs are less willing than non-PWDs to compete Not supported 
H8 Females are less willing than males to compete Not supported 
H9 PWDs are more altruistic than non-PWDs Not supported 
H10 Females are more altruistic than males Not supported 
H11 PWDs are more inclined to view all inequalities as unfair 
regardless of individual performance 
Not supported 
H12 Females and males share fairness views Supported 
H13 Priming has a negative effect on PWD’s performance Not supported 
H14 Females perform worse than males Supported 
H15 PWDs are less confident than non-PWDs Supported 
H16 Priming has a negative effect on the confidence of PWD Contradicted 
H17 Females are generally less confident than males Not supported 
H18 People have prejudices against PWDs Supported 
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9 DISCUSSION 
The main focus of this paper is prejudice and lack of self-confidence, i.e. psychological barriers to 
entrepreneurship among PWDs, which are influenced by social identity. The main finding is an 
empowerment effect of priming, i.e. making the social identity of PWDs salient increases the 
confidence of PWDs. This finding contradicts the common perception that PWDs lack self-
confidence. However, it is probably due to a selection effect; the PWD sample is not 
representative of PWDs. First, PWDs seem to come from more resourceful families, indicating 
that only PWDs with access to a certain level of resources are able to get an education. Second, 
the recruited PWDs are the elite because many PWDs are excluded from education; they have 
managed to reach secondary school, while the average PWD drops out of school or is not enrolled 
at all. Thus, the participants probably have family and friends who have instilled the attitude 
“Yes, you can” into their minds, unlike the many PWDs who are surrounded by people perceiving 
PWDs as incapable of doing anything. Nevertheless, people generally believe that PWDs perform 
worse than non-PWDs, although they actually perform equally well. The results suggest that 
prejudice is a key barrier to entrepreneurship among PWDs. The fact that PWDs and non-PWDs 
share the belief that PWDs are inferior performers, suggests that PWDs have internalized the 
social norms causing prejudices. 
Evidences suggest that female PWDs are more vulnerable than male PWDs; they constitute the 
only underconfident group. Thus, lack of confidence is likely to be a barrier to entrepreneurship 
among female PWDs, although the results suggest that they are not significantly less willing to 
compete than males or other PWDs; prejudices might deter the underconfident group from 
entering entrepreneurship to a greater extent than confident groups. People might be concerned 
about the ability of females to run a business as they often are less well-educated than males. 
Although evidence suggests that females are not less willing to gamble, they might be less 
inclined to take risk in real life due to trust issues. They might for instance doubt that customers 
or suppliers will keep their promises. However, females are generally more patient, i.e. a valuable 
attitude concerning entrepreneurship. Altogether, the results indicate that it might be inadequate 
to target PWDs equally across gender; policies aiming at building confidence might be essential 
to empower female PWDs. 
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The empowerment effect of selection indicates that explicitly targeting PWDs with regards to 
entrepreneurship might not be damaging; it would elicit positive attitudes among PWDs rather 
than negative attitudes. However, focusing on disability might provoke prejudices against PWDs. 
Although PWDs are somehow accepted in school, there might be powerful social norms stating 
that it is not appropriate for PWDs to run a business. Thus, focusing on disability in order to 
encourage entrepreneurship among PWDs could be detrimental due to negative stereotypes, and 
portraying PWDs as victims might have unfavorable effects on social exclusion. Affirmative 
actions could yield a desirable outcome if the programs are seen as an apology for previous 
discrimination, but as long as prejudices are not eliminated, these actions are more likely to be 
perceived as a helping hand to those in need; thereby increasing the awareness of social 
differences. 
Although non-PWDs and PWDs become legally equals, social exclusion will persist as long as 
non-PWDs continue to exclude PWDs because they do not fit in according to social norms. If 
PWDs risk being excluded because they cannot become a successful entrepreneur in terms of 
social norms, they might completely refrain from such profitable activities; they rather choose a 
self-destructive behavior. For instance, PWDs might have an attitude of helplessness, like they 
have no opportunity to manage their own lives. PWDs will refrain from entrepreneurship as long 
as the difficulty of being an entrepreneur with disabilities, caused by exclusion, is larger than the 
difficulty of being a beggar or object of charity. Thus, it implies that awareness raising among 
non-PWDs, in order to fight negative stereotypes and thereby reduce the extent of social 
exclusion, is critical to make other programs effective, i.e. programs aiming at improving the lives 
of PWDs. However, one could argue that awareness raising is efficient only to the extent to which 
prejudices are driven by false beliefs, rather than taste; one might dislike a person or group 
despite having complete information. As taste-based discrimination is common and seem to be 
responsive to the price of prejudice, policies aiming at increasing the price might also be 
effective. Nevertheless, it might not be realistic to implement such strategies in developing 
countries due to high expenses. 
Automatic prejudice against PWDs is likely to occur because people often associate them with 
maltreatment and victimization; such egalitarian associations often contribute to automatic 
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prejudices. Thus, it is important that organizations of PWDs still aim at treating PWDs as persons 
with rights rather than treating them as victims or objects of charity. 
Although it is hard to change personal beliefs, it might be possible to change the perceptions of 
social norms. For instance, one could broadcast a soap opera on radio or TV and in that way 
intertwine entertainment and educational messages related to disability. However, the norms 
might not impact behavior on a large scale unless they are made salient in a particular situation. 
Nevertheless, the findings in this paper suggest that social norms could be of great importance in 
the moment of decision. Moreover, actions could possibly alter norms, the social identity of 
PWDs and non-PWDs, respectively, and the social status of each group. Thus, social differences 
could change over time due to interactions between social norms, social identity, and behavior. 
Thus, policies aiming at changing the perception of social norms could promote equalization of 
opportunities and active participation of PWDs in mainstream development processes. 
There are limitations of the study as mentioned in section 6.1. First, the participants might not be 
representative to the general population, i.e. there is a selection effect of recruiting PWDs who are 
more empowered than the average PWD. Second, a lab experiment is unfavorable in that the 
findings might differ from what one would find in a natural setting. For instance, the time 
preferences revealed in this paper might differ from the preferences in a business-related situation. 
In the business world, the time span is probably longer and the uncertainty regarding delayed 
gratification higher. A longer time span generates a greater loss in utility itself, and also increases 
the possibility of unexpected events that could hold back the reward. In the experiment, the 
participants might not perceive it as more risky to wait for the late payment. Regarding attitude to 
risk, people might have different attitudes toward gambling and taking risk as a business person. 
Gambling involves risk that is independent of individual skills, whereas entrepreneurship implies 
betting on one’s own success. Thus, although PWDs turn out to be significantly more willing to 
take risk in this experiment, they might not be more willing to take risk in real life. The results 
indicate that there is no difference between PWDs and non-PWDs concerning willingness to 
compete. However, PWDs are possibly less inclined to bet on their own success by entering 
entrepreneurship, due to prejudices and social norms declaring that entrepreneurship is not 
appropriate for PWDs. 
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The findings of this paper suggest that making the social identity of PWDs salient increases the 
confidence and willingness to take risk. However, the sample is not representative of the 
population as the participants with disabilities have access to more resources than the average 
PWD; both monetary and psychological support. These circumstances call for research on the 
social identity of less empowered PWDs to examine their mindsets and the effect of priming. Of 
particular interest is the effect of priming on confidence and performance for a typical PWD, i.e. 
whether making the social identity of PWDs salient decreases the confidence and causes 
stereotype threat. 
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